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STRADDLING THE COLUMBIA: A CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW PROFESSOR’S MUSINGS ON CIRCUMVENTING
WASHINGTON STATE’S CRIMINAL PROHIBITION ON
COMPENSATED SURROGACY
Peter Nicolas ∗
INTRODUCTION
I have spent most of my professional life as a law professor at the
University of Washington specializing in constitutional law, yet when
asked as a child what I wanted to be when I grew up, neither “lawyer”
nor “professor” rolled off my tongue. Instead, when queried by adults or
other children, I succinctly and matter-of-factly stated that I wanted to be
a “mommy.” At that young age, I only had two primary role models: my
mother, who at the time was a full-time mommy, and my father, who
was a doctor. My squeamishness about blood and guts certainly made
being a “mommy” the natural default choice.
I was, of course, teased a bit by my contemporaries for my genderbending choice of a career path and told by adults that only girls could
be mommies. Indeed, when I was growing up even young girls were
encouraged to think about a future that included something other than
motherhood. To avoid unwelcome future attention to myself I was thus
quickly socialized to suppress my desire to “mother” children. As I grew
older and came to the self-realization that I was gay, these early life
lessons likewise counseled in favor of keeping that little bit of
information to myself as well.
I soon learned that the combined forces of law and biology together
served as significant roadblocks for a gay man interested in becoming a
legal parent to a child. The law in many states has long been hostile to
gay parenting, with some states prohibiting adoption in the first instance
by gay individuals 1 or same-sex couples, 2 and other states prohibiting
∗

Jeffrey & Susan Brotman Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor of Gender, Women & Sexuality
Studies, University of Washington. I wish to thank Anna Endter, Grace Feldman, and Cheryl R.
Nyberg of the University of Washington Gallagher Law Library for their invaluable research
assistance.
1. See FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sp. “A” Sess.); Act of May 25,
1987, ch. 343, 1987 N.H. LAWS 379.
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so-called second-parent adoption, whereby one same-sex partner adopts
the natural or adopted child of the other. 3 Moreover, neither I nor my
future partner could be a “mother” in the gestational or genetic sense of
the word since as men we lack two critical ingredients for creating
human life, wombs and eggs. 4 Thus, if I was to achieve my goal of
becoming a “mother” in the nurturing sense of that word, 5 I was going to
need the assistance of one or more women. I thus ventured into the
complex legal and medical world of becoming a parent through the
assistance of a surrogate and an egg donor.
In this Article, I recount—through both the prisms of an intended
parent and a constitutional law scholar—my successful efforts to
become a parent via compensated surrogacy and egg donation. Part I of
this Article provides a narrative of my experience in becoming a parent
via compensated surrogacy, and the various state and federal legal
roadblocks and deterrents that I encountered along the way, including
Washington State’s criminal prohibition on compensated surrogacy as
well as federal guidelines issued by the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration regarding the use of sperm by gay donors in the process
of in vitro fertilization. Part II of this Article considers the extent to
which laws that criminalize or otherwise restrict one’s ability to enter
into surrogacy arrangements run afoul of either the substantive
protections of the Due Process Clause or the guarantees of the Equal
Protection Clause. Part III of this Article considers the extent to which
laws that stand in the way of intended parents establishing legal
parentage of children born via surrogacy violate those same
constitutional guarantees.
I conclude that laws that restrict one’s ability to enter into surrogacy
arrangements violate both the long-recognized fundamental right to
procreate 6 as well as a more specifically articulated fundamental right to
2. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg., 1st, and 2d
Extraordinary Sess.); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 48-2-301(c) (West, Westlaw through ch. 1–117 2014
Reg. Sess.); Adoption of Meaux, 417 So. 2d 522, 523 (La. Ct. App. 1982); In re Adams, 473
N.W.2d 712, 714 (Mich. 1991); In re Adoption of M.C.D., 42 P.3d 873, 878 (Okla. Civ. App.
2001); In re Guardianship of O.G.M-K., 787 N.W.2d 848, 850 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010).
3. See S.J.L.S. v. T.L.S., 265 S.W.3d 804, 822 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008); In re Adoption of Luke, 640
N.W.2d 374, 383 (Neb. 2002); Boseman v. Jarrell, 704 S.E.2d 494, 502 (N.C. 2010); In re Bonfield,
780 N.E.2d 241, 247 (Ohio 2002); In re Interest of Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 680 (Wis.
1994).
4. One of us, of course, could by providing sperm serve as the genetic father to a child.
5. For an excellent overview of the ways in which men can be mothers in this sense, see Darren
Rosenblum, Unsex Mothering: Toward a New Culture of Parenting, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 57
(2012).
6. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
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procreate with the assistance of third parties, while laws that stand in the
way of intended parents establishing legal parentage of children born via
surrogacy violate the fundamental right to care for and have custody of
one’s children. 7 In addition, I demonstrate that some of these restrictive
statutory schemes can also be challenged on the ground that they violate
the equal protection rights not only of those seeking to have children via
surrogacy, but also the children born to them.
I.

MY JOURNEY TO PARENTHOOD VIA COMPENSATED
SURROGACY

A.

Criminalizing Commercial Surrogacy: The Washington State
Approach

After graduating from law school and clerking for a federal judge, I
had the good fortune of relocating to Seattle, Washington after securing
a teaching job at the University of Washington School of Law. During
the years I have lived in Washington, the state legislature enacted a
series of laws designed to further the rights of sexual minorities,
including a statewide antidiscrimination law, 8 a statewide domestic
partnership registry, 9 and ultimately, a state law extending full marriage
rights to same-sex couples. 10
After my then-domestic partner (now husband) and I had been
together for a decade, we began to explore the possibility of becoming
parents via surrogacy. We learned that there were two types of
surrogacy, traditional and gestational. With traditional surrogacy, the
surrogate allows her eggs to be artificially inseminated with the sperm of
an intended father, with the result being that the surrogate has not only a
gestational but also a genetic connection to the resulting child. 11 In
contrast, with gestational surrogacy an embryo is created through the
process of in vitro fertilization using the eggs of another woman, either

7. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
8. See Act of Jan. 31, 2006, ch. 4, 2006 Wash. Sess. Laws 12 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE
§ 49.60.030 (2012)).
9. See Act of Apr. 21, 2007, ch. 156, 2007 Wash. Sess. Laws 616 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 26.60.010–26.60.070, (2012)).
10. See Act of Feb. 13, 2012, ch. 3, 2012 Wash. Sess. Laws 199 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 26.04.010–2604.070).
11. See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 894 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); In re
C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 720 (Tenn. 2005); In re Paternity of F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d 634, 643 (Wis.
2013).
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those of the intended mother or a third-party egg donor. This embryo is
implanted in the surrogate, who subsequently gives birth to a child to
whom she has no genetic connection. 12 We also learned that either type
of surrogacy arrangement could be either “altruistic” or
“uncompensated” on the one hand or “commercial” or “compensated”
on the other. With altruistic surrogacy, the surrogate receives no
compensation (save for that necessary to cover any expenses associated
with the pregnancy and birth), while with commercial surrogacy the
surrogate receives a fee for serving as a surrogate.13 Altruistic surrogacy
often involves a close friend or family member serving as a surrogate,
while commercial surrogacy involves a person that the intended parents
met solely for the purpose of arranging a surrogate birth.
While trying to wrap our heads around the different types of
surrogacy, we were surprised to learn that, despite the otherwise
favorable legal atmosphere for same-sex couples in Washington State,
Washington law not only renders compensated surrogacy contracts
unenforceable, 14 but actually makes it a crime to enter into them. 15
Specifically, under Washington law, entering into such contracts is a
“gross misdemeanor” 16 punishable by up to 364 days in prison and a fine
of up to $5,000. 17 Moreover, custody of the child born via the surrogacy
arrangement would be left to the discretion and uncertainty of a judge
applying a multi-factored statutory test. 18 Uncompensated surrogacy, in
contrast, is not a crime under Washington law. In 2011, when we were in
the midst of exploring surrogacy, the Washington House of
Representatives voted in favor of a bill that would have decriminalized
surrogacy, regulated and provided for the enforcement of gestational
surrogacy agreements, and left traditional surrogacy arrangements
unregulated. 19 However, the bill failed to advance in the Washington
Senate. Thus, unless someone within the state was willing to serve as a
surrogate for us without being compensated for her efforts, a rather
unlikely—and in my mind, unreasonable—prospect, we had to look
outside of the state in search of a jurisdiction with a more favorable legal
12. See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 894; In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d at 720; In
re Paternity of F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d at 643.
13. See In re Paternity of F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d at 657 & n.10.
14. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.240 (2012).
15. See id. §§ 26.26.230–26.26.250.
16. See id. § 26.26.250.
17. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.92.020 (2012).
18. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.260.
19. See H.B. 1267, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011).
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atmosphere for surrogacy.
B.

A Legal Patchwork: A Survey of the Law of Surrogacy in the
United States

Since pursuing surrogacy in our home state was not an option, we had
to select another state or country in which to pursue surrogacy. For us,
the key consideration was to select a jurisdiction with favorable laws on
the issue, or, if not favorable, at least not hostile to surrogacy.
There are a handful of foreign countries where compensated
surrogacy is lawful, far less expensive than in the United States, and that
cater to foreigners, including India, Thailand, and Mexico. 20 Yet, even if
we were willing to overlook our desire that the surrogate live close
enough to us that we could attend key appointments and the birth of our
future child, there were other reasons to pursue surrogacy domestically.
For starters, the child would be considered born “out of wedlock” to a
U.S. father and a foreign mother. Under U.S. immigration laws,
establishing U.S. citizenship for such a child is somewhat more
complicated than for a child born out-of-wedlock to a U.S. mother or “in
wedlock” to an opposite-sex U.S. couple. 21 Second, judgments of
parentage in sister states are entitled to Full Faith and Credit under the
U.S. Constitution even in states that otherwise would not permit samesex parentage of a child to be established in the first instance.22 In
contrast, recognition of a judgment of parentage from a foreign country
(if one were even available) would be recognized only at the discretion
of each individual U.S. state. 23
Having turned our focus stateside, we were still faced with a wide
spectrum of legal regimes from which to choose. 24 We discovered that
20. See Tamar Lewin, Coming to U.S. for Baby, and Womb to Carry It, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2014,
at A1. India has since modified its laws so as to permit only married opposite-sex couples to pursue
surrogacy there. See India Bans Gay Foreign Couples from Surrogacy, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 18, 2013,
2:57 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/9811222/India-bans-gay-foreigncouples-from-surrogacy.html.
21. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1409 (2012). These laws have been upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court
despite their sex-based classifications. See Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001).
22. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; Baker by Thomas v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232–
33 (1998); Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1151–56 (10th Cir. 2007); Henry v. Himes, No.
1:14–CV–129, 2014 WL 1418395, at *17, 18 n.24 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 2014), rev’d on other
grounds sub nom. DeBoer v. Snyder, Nos.14-1341, 3057, 3464, 5291, 5297, 5818, 2014 WL
5748990 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2014); Embry v. Ryan, 11 So. 3d 408, 409–10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
23. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tremblay, 223 U.S. 185, 190 (1912).
24. We were engaged in the process of selecting a state in which to pursue surrogacy in 2011 and
2012, but there have since been some significant changes in state laws. The overview that follows
presents the current state of affairs rather than the precise state of affairs in 2011 and 2012 to make
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state laws governing surrogacy can be divided into roughly six
categories, ranging from criminalization of surrogacy at one extreme to
detailed laws providing for the full enforceability of surrogacy
agreements at the other and a variety of other approaches—including no
substantive law one way or the other on the issue—in between.
Balancing our desire for legal certainty against competing
considerations, we ultimately selected one of the in-between
jurisdictions whose substantive law was neither hostile nor clearly
favorable to surrogacy arrangements.
The first group of states to be crossed off the list were those on one
extreme that, like Washington, 25 not only declared all contracts for
compensated surrogacy unenforceable but made entering into any such
contracts a punishable civil or criminal offense. 26 This included
Michigan, 27 New York, 28 and Washington, D.C. 29 Also off the list were
a second set of states that, while not making compensated surrogacy
arrangements a punishable offense, had statutes or case law declaring
surrogacy contracts to be unenforceable. This included Arizona, 30
Indiana, 31 Nebraska, 32 and New Jersey, 33 and for traditional surrogacy
it of greater utility to researchers as well as those currently considering surrogacy.
25. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.26.230–26.26.250 (2012).
26. Excluded from this list are states, such as Kentucky, Maryland, and Oklahoma that
criminalize only compensated traditional surrogacy. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (West,
Westlaw through 2014 legislation); In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115, 130–31 (Md. 2007); Family
Law: Adoption—Although Surrogacy Contract Involving Payment of Fee to Birth Mother Is Illegal
and Unenforceable Under Maryland Law, Invalid Payments Do Not Bar Approval of Adoption
Petition, 85 Op. Md. Att’y Gen. 348, 366 n.22 (2000); Is a Surrogate Gestation Contract a Violation
of Oklahoma’s Trafficking in Children Statutes?, 83 Op. Okla. Att’y Gen. 162 (1983). Also
excluded from the list is Virginia, which does not criminalize surrogacy but does make it a crime for
third parties who facilitate such contracts to earn a fee. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 (West,
Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess. & 2014 Special Sess.).
27. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.859 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess. Act 282)
(mandating up to one year in prison and $10,000 fine for contracting parties, and up to five years in
prison and $50,000 fine for third parties facilitating such contracts).
28. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 121–123 (McKinney, Westlaw through 2014 legislation)
(imposing $500 civil penalty for those entering into them, with greater civil and criminal penalties
for third parties facilitating such contracts).
29. See D.C. CODE §§ 16-401, 16-402 (West, Westlaw through Sept. 1, 2014) (imposing up to
one year in prison and $10,000 fine for anyone involved in the contracting process).
30. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218(A) (West, Westlaw through 2d Reg. & Special Sess.
2014).
31. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-20-1-1, 31-20-1-2 (West, Westlaw through 2d Reg. Sess. and 2d
Technical Sess. 2014).
32. See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-21,200 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.).
33. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1240 (N.J. 1988); A.H.W. v. G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948, 952–
54 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
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contracts only, Louisiana 34 and North Dakota. 35 Many of the states in
this second group have statutory provisions that take the further step of
explicitly declaring the surrogate to be the legal mother and—if she is
married—her husband the legal father,36 thus complicating the
establishment of legal parentage.
A third group of states had laws somewhat more favorable to
surrogacy arrangements, but these states overregulate the process to the
point that surrogacy is not a realistic option in those states for many
people. Specifically, Florida, 37 Texas, 38 Utah, 39 and Virginia 40 have
detailed statutes making surrogacy agreements entered into that satisfy
the statutes’ requirements valid and enforceable, but they contain various
provisions that make them of limited utility for most couples. For
example, the Florida 41 and Virginia 42 statutes do not apply to agreements
that provide compensation beyond expenses related to the surrogacy
process. 43 The Virginia statute requires that a “home study”—a typical
requirement for people seeking to adopt a child—be done of both the
surrogate and the intended parents. 44 Furthermore, in Texas 45 and

34. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.).
35. See Assisted Conception Act, ch. 184, § 5, 1989 N.D. Laws 562 (1989) (codified at N.D.
CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-18-05 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.)).
36. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218(B)–(C) (West, Westlaw through 2d Reg. &
Special Sess. 2014); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-18-05 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.).
37. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sp. “A” Sess.).
38. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 160.751–160.763 (West, Westlaw through 3d Called Sess.
2013).
39. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-15-801 to 78B-15-809 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Gen.
Sess.).
40. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156 to 20-165 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess. & 2014
Special Sess.).
41. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(4) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sp. “A” Sess.). The statute,
however, allows for compensation for “living” expenses, which some interpret as allowing you to
pay for the surrogate’s monthly rent or mortgage and similar expenses during the pregnancy in an
amount that often parallels the compensation given to surrogates in states where there are no
restrictions on compensation. See, e.g., Gestational Surrogacy: Price List (2014),
DREAMABABY.COM, http://www.dreamababy.com/downloads/Gestational%20Surrogacy%20Price
%20List.pdf (last visited July 16, 2014); Intended Parents and Parents Via Surrogacy: IP in
Florida—”No Compensation”?, ALLABOUTSURROGACY.COM, http://www.allaboutsurrogacy.
com/forums/index.php?showtopic=55448 (last visited July 12, 2014).
42. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156, 20-160(B)(4), 20-162(A) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg.
Sess. & 2014 Special Sess.).
43. See, e.g., Gestational Surrogacy: Price List (2014), supra note 41 (describing “living
expenses”).
44. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160.
45. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.756 (West, Westlaw through 3d Called Sess. 2013).
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Virginia, 46 the agreement is enforceable only if pre-approved by a court.
These statutes also contain a variety of other requirements for a
surrogacy contract to be valid, such as proof that surrogacy is a medical
necessity for the intended parents,47 that the surrogate has had at least
one prior pregnancy and delivery, 48 a minimum age of the participants,49
informed consent of medical risks for the surrogate, 50 psychological
evaluations of the participants, 51 and the like. 52
A fourth group of states have enacted statutory provisions that
facilitate parentage determinations where surrogacy is involved by either
explicitly providing that the intended parents are the legal parents or
explicitly providing a mechanism for amending birth certificates where
surrogacy arrangements are involved. This includes Arkansas,53
Connecticut, 54 North Dakota 55 and for uncompensated surrogacy only,
Washington. 56 But these statutes otherwise do not provide detail on the
requirements, if any, for an enforceable surrogacy contract.57

46. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160.
47. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(2) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sp. “A” Sess.); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 160.756(b)(2); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-803(2)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2014
Gen. Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(B)(8).
48. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-803(2)(f); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.756(b)(5); VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-160(B)(6).
49. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(1) (eighteen years); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-801(2)(i)
(twenty-one years).
50. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.754(d).
51. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-803(2)(d); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(B)(7).
52. In addition to these various limitations, these statutes also require that the couple be in a
legally recognized marriage. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(1); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 160.754(b); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-801(3); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156, 20-159 (defining
“Intended parents”). At the time we were pursuing surrogacy, these states all had constitutional
amendments refusing to permit or recognize same-sex marriages. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 27; TEX.
CONST. art. I, § 32; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29; VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A. Given recent decisions
declaring that these state constitutional amendments violate the federal constitution, see Kitchen v.
Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1213 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014); De Leon v.
Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 639–40 (W.D. Tex. 2014); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 384 (4th
Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 308 (2014), this limitation is no longer of consequence for samesex couples pursuing surrogacy in these states.
53. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Extraordinary Sess.).
54. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-48(a) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.). The
Connecticut provision encompasses gestational surrogacy only.
55. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-01, 14-18-08 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.). The
North Dakota provision encompasses gestational surrogacy only.
56. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.101(1), (8) (2012).
57. See, e.g., Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783, 785 n.4 (Conn. 2011) (leaving open what the
requirements are for an enforceable contract).

13 - Nicolas_Final for Publication.docx (Do Not Delete)

2014]

STRADDLING THE COLUMBIA

12/16/20146:32 PM

1243

A fifth group of states—California, 58 Delaware, 59 Illinois, 60 Nevada, 61
and New Hampshire, 62—go the furthest in providing for the enforcement
and facilitation of gestational surrogacy contracts. Unlike the statutes in
some of the states that make surrogacy contracts enforceable but heavily
regulate them, these statutes do not require court pre-approval of the
agreement. The California statute has the most modest requirements,
essentially requiring only that the parties be represented by separate
legal counsel, 63 while the Nevada statute is nearly as hands-off,
requiring only separate legal representation 64 and a medical evaluation
of the surrogate. 65 The Delaware, Illinois, and New Hampshire statutes
contain a variety of requirements in addition to representation by
separate legal counsel 66 and medical evaluation of the surrogate, 67 such
as that the surrogate be at least twenty-one years old, 68 have given birth
to one child, 69 and undergone a mental health evaluation, 70 and that the
intended parents have undergone a mental health evaluation. 71 In
addition, the Delaware and Illinois statutes require that the surrogate
have health insurance, 72 and the Illinois statute specifies that at least one
58. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962 (West, Westlaw though 2014 Reg. Sess. ch. 531). Prior
California case law had declared such contracts to be enforceable. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776,
784–85 (Cal. 1993).
59. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 8-801 to 8-813 (West, Westlaw through 2014 ch. 428).
60. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47 / 1–75 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess. Act 98925).
61. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 126.710–126.810 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. &
Special Sess.).
62. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:1 to 168-B:21 (West, Westlaw through ch. 330 of 2014
Reg. Sess.).
63. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962.
64. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.740(1)(b), (2).
65. See id. § 126.740(1)(a).
66. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-806(a)(5), (b)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2014 ch. 428); 750
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47 / 20(a)(5), (b)(4) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess. Act 98-925);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:9(V).
67. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-806(a)(3); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47 / 20(a)(3); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:9(III).
68. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-806(a)(1); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47 / 20(a)(1); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:9(I).
69. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-806(a)(2); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47 / 20(a)(2); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:9(II).
70. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-806(a)(4); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47 / 20(a)(4); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:9(IV).
71. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-806(b)(1); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47 / 20(b)(3); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:8(I).
72. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-806(a)(6); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47 / 20(a)(6).
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of the intended parents provide the gametes 73 and that there is a medical
necessity for pursuing surrogacy. 74 Assuming the statutory requirements
are satisfied, the statutes in these five states allow for a pre-birth order,
or “PBO,” whereby the legal parentage of the intended parents is
determined in a proceeding that takes place before the child is born. 75
Moreover, like many of the states in the fourth group, these states have
statutory provisions declaring that the intended parents, not the surrogate
and her husband, are the child’s legal parents. 76
In the remaining states, the legislatures have taken no position on the
enforceability of surrogacy agreements. In two states—New Mexico 77
and Tennessee 78—the legislatures have taken the unusual step of
enacting statutes declaring this official neutrality. In the other states, the
legislature has either enacted no statutes whatsoever on the subject or
only enacted statutes addressing discrete issues, such as statutes
declaring that surrogacy arrangements do not violate state criminal
statutes prohibiting baby selling 79 or statutes addressing intestate
succession where surrogacy is involved. 80 In some of these states, courts
have issued opinions declaring or strongly implying that surrogacy
contracts are enforceable, including Maryland,81 Massachusetts, 82
Ohio, 83 Pennsylvania, 84 Tennessee, 85 and Wisconsin, 86 although what
73. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47 / 20(b)(1).
74. See id. at 47 / 20(b)(2).
75. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962(e) (West, Westlaw though 2014 Reg. Sess. ch. 531); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 13, § 8-611(b); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47 / 35; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.720(4)
(West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. & Special Sess.); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:12.
76. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962(f)(1); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-804; 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 47 / 15; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.670; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:5, 7.
77. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-801 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Reg. Sess.).
78. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-102 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Reg. Sess.).
79. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 710.11 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 163.537 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-14h(e)(3)
(West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Extraordinary Sess.).
80. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-121 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Reg. Sess.);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 524.1-201, 524.2-120, 524.2-121 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-121 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Reg. Sess.).
81. See In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115, 131 (Md. 2007).
82. See Hodas v. Morin, 814 N.E.2d 320, 324–27 (Mass. 2004); Culliton v. Beth Isr. Deaconess
Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 1133, 1137–38 (Mass. 2001).
83. See J.F. v. D.B., 879 N.E.2d 740, 741 (Ohio 2007); S.N. v. M.B., 935 N.E.2d 463, 471 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2010). The Ohio courts have left open, however, the question whether traditional (as
contrasted with gestational) surrogacy agreements are enforceable. See J.F., 879 N.E.2d at 742.
84. See J.F. v. D.B., 897 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).
85. See In re Baby, No. M2012-01040-SC-R11-JV, 2014 WL 4815211, at *20 (Tenn. Sept. 18,
2014).
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exactly is required for such an agreement to be enforceable is not
entirely clear.
All other states in this final group occupy a sort of “No Man’s (or in
this case, perhaps more appropriately “Woman’s”) Land” in which
surrogacy contracts are neither clearly enforceable nor clearly
unenforceable. In these states, the extent to which courts will assist in
the process—such as by issuing PBOs—is not something that you can
find by simply doing a Westlaw or LexisNexis search because there
have been no cases that have resulted in binding appellate court
decisions on the enforceability of surrogacy contracts. Rather, surrogacy
in these states occurs in the shadows, so to speak, with intended parents
and surrogates working in conjunction with a small group of experienced
attorneys and trial court judges to facilitate such arrangements.
Given this national state of affairs, the closest state with the most
favorable legal environment for surrogacy was California. Yet while
relatively close, realistically it was too far away to allow for regularly
attending key appointments, and certainly too far to get to quickly on
short notice for an unexpectedly early birth. Moreover, the estimated
costs for pursuing gestational surrogacy in California using one of its
more popular agencies is $150,000 or more, and that assumes everything
goes right on one’s first try. 87 If we had unlimited resources and the
money was mostly going to the people doing the hardest and riskiest
work—the surrogate and the egg donor—it would be worth the cost to
become a parent. But with only twenty-five percent of that amount going
to those two individuals, it was a good deal primarily for the surrogacy
agencies, doctors, lawyers, pharmacies, and psychologists involved in
the process. 88 These intermediaries do important work and deserve to be
reasonably compensated for it, but the ratio struck me as a bit off. With
California off the list and the other states with positive law too far away
to meet our criteria, we started to take a look at one of the states where
surrogacy occurs in the shadows closer to home, in Oregon.

86. See In re Paternity of F.T.R., 888 N.W.2d 634, 638 (Wis. 2013).
87. See Cost of Hiring a Surrogate, GROWING GENERATIONS, http://www.growinggenerations.com/
surrogacy-program/intended-parents/surrogacy-cost/ (last visited July 14, 2014).
GENERATIONS,
88. See,
e.g.,
Egg
Donation:
Compensation,
GROWING
http://www.growinggenerations.com/egg-donor-program/egg-donors/egg-donor-pay/ (last visited
July 14, 2014); Cost of Hiring a Surrogate, supra note 87; Surrogacy: Compensation, GROWING
GENERATIONS, http://www.growinggenerations.com/surrogacy-program/surrogates/surrogatemother-pay/ (last visited July 14, 2014). See generally Lewin, supra note 20, at A1. At the time we
were engaged in the surrogacy process, the fee paid to the surrogate was several thousand dollars
lower.
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Surrogacy in the Shadows: The Oregon Approach

The largest city in Oregon—Portland—is located just across the
border from Washington State and in good traffic is just under a threehour drive away from Seattle. It is located in between California and
Washington State not only geographically but, so far as surrogacy goes,
legally. There are no statutes or court decisions addressing the
enforceability of surrogacy contracts or the availability of PBOs, save
for a statute making clear that paying a surrogate a fee does not violate
the state’s criminal child-selling statutes. 89
A good sign that compensated surrogacy arrangements occur in an
“in-the-shadows” jurisdiction is the presence of surrogacy agencies as
well as doctors and lawyers specializing in surrogacy, and a quick
internet search turned up several of each in Oregon. I spoke at length
with the directors of three surrogacy agencies in Oregon, as well as a
few attorneys and a couple of clinics specializing in surrogacy
arrangements, all of whom assured me that despite the absence of
published law on the issue of surrogacy, in practice—at least at the trial
court level in Portland—judges routinely signed PBOs declaring
intended parents the legal parents of children born to surrogates within
the state. Moreover, relative to California, gestational surrogacy was a
bargain in Oregon, costing about half as much even though the
surrogates and egg donors earned about the same amount, with the
biggest difference being the fees charged by the surrogacy agencies and
the lawyers in the two states. 90
Yet pursuing surrogacy in a state without an established statutory
scheme governing surrogacy was not without some risk, and thus the
“market price” for the intermediaries perhaps reflects this risk. Unlike
states such as California, which have statutes making clear that the
intended parents—not the surrogate and her husband if she is married—
are the legal parents of the child, Oregon’s statutory scheme is more
traditional. If a woman gives birth to a child, her name must appear on
the child’s original birth certificate. 91 Moreover, her husband is
rebuttably presumed to be the child’s father, 92 and a challenge to that

89. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.537 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.).
FAMILIES
NW,
LLC,
90. See,
e.g.,
Anticipated
Expenses,
FUTURE
http://www.futurefamiliesnw.com/anticipated-expenses.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2014); Costs,
GREATEST GIFT SURROGACY CENTER NW, http://ggscnw.com/intended-parents/costs/ (last visited
Oct. 27, 2014).
91. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432.088(8) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.).
92. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.070(1)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.).
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presumption cannot be brought by anyone other than the woman or her
husband so long as they are married and cohabiting. 93 This presumption
meant that if the surrogate and her husband decided to keep the child, the
statutory scheme would seem to conclusively provide that they were the
legal parents.
However, the statutory scheme in Oregon—while not expressly
making reference to surrogacy arrangements (as do the statutes in the
fourth group of states)—did seem to have a mechanism for having a
court declare someone other than the birth mother and her husband to be
a child’s legal parents. With respect to the birth mother, even though
state law provides that the birth mother’s name must appear on the
original birth certificate, it further provides that if a court determines that
a woman other than the birth mother is the genetic mother, the court can
order the birth certificate amended to remove the birth mother’s name
and have the original placed under seal. 94 Moreover, although the birth
mother’s husband is ordinarily listed as the legal father on the original
birth certificate, if a court order declares someone else to be the father
then that person’s name shall appear on the original birth certificate. 95
Of course, these sorts of concerns only come into play when things go
wrong, and in the overwhelming majority of surrogacy arrangements,
everything goes smoothly, even in states where surrogacy occurs in the
shadows. Indeed, the absence of cases addressing the enforceability of
surrogacy contracts that is one of the hallmarks of a “shadow”
jurisdiction is a sign that surrogacy arrangements in those states have
thus far gone smoothly, since it is typically only when disputes arise
between surrogates and intended parents that either appellate court
decisions are published or corrective legislation enacted. 96
Yet the fact that there is no formal law regulating surrogacy in states
such as Oregon does not mean that the situation is akin to the “Wild
Wild West” as some have written about the surrogacy process in such
jurisdictions. 97 The intermediaries in the surrogacy process—the
surrogacy agencies, lawyers, and doctors—have filled that vacuum with

93. See id. § 109.070(2).
94. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432.088(8).
95. See id. § 432.088(9)(d).
96. See generally infra Part II.C.1. On occasion, the surrogate and the intended parents are not in
a dispute with one another, but instead are in a dispute with a state agency that refuses to amend the
birth certificate to reflect the intent of the parties. See, e.g., J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1269
(D. Utah 2002).
97. See, e.g., Alexander N. Hecht, The Wild Wild West: Inadequate Regulation of Assisted
Reproductive Technology, 1 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 227, 228 (2001).
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their own unwritten law that in many ways incorporates many of the
safeguards that can be found in states that have detailed statutory
regimes governing surrogacy. Indeed, these intermediaries have a
powerful incentive to self-regulate to ensure successful surrogacy
journeys, since they stand to lose if a dispute results in negative
appellate court precedent or statutory law.
Thus, I learned that all of the agencies have similar criteria for wouldbe surrogates that are designed to weed out those who might be
unprepared to give up custody of the child they give birth to. These
include requirements that the surrogate already have had at least one
child that she is parenting and that she undergo a psychological
examination and criminal background check. 98 Many of the agencies are
run by former surrogates who know from experience what it takes to be
a surrogate, and thus have a good nose for quickly sifting would-be
surrogates. 99
Moreover, even if an agency approves a surrogate and she is matched
with intended parents, the reproductive medicine clinics have their own
criteria that are often more stringent than those of the surrogacy
agencies. For example, although some agencies will still work with
traditional surrogates, most reproductive medicine clinics will not.100
Since traditional surrogacy cases—in which the surrogate has a genetic
link to the resulting child—are far more likely to result in custody
disputes, 101 this extra level of screening likewise has the effect of
minimizing possible custody disputes. In addition, our reproductive
medicine clinic required that the parties submit a copy of their signed
surrogacy contract, which necessarily added a third level of screening—
that of the attorneys. The back-and-forth of the attorneys in negotiating
the terms of the contract ensured that important topics likely to result in
possible disputes were fully considered and resolved.
To be sure, these safeguards are by no means foolproof. Intended
parents and surrogates could circumvent the agency screening by finding
98. See,
e.g.,
Becoming
a
Surrogate,
NW
SURROGACY
CENTER,
LLC,
http://www.nwsurrogacycenter.com/becoming_a_surrogate_mother.html (last visited July 22,
2014); Surrogates, FUTURE FAMILIES NW, LLC, http://www.futurefamiliesnw.com/surrogates.html
(last visited July 22, 2014); Surrogates, GREATEST GIFT SURROGACY CENTER NW,
http://ggscnw.com/surrogates/ (last visited July 22, 2014).
99. See, e.g., About Us, FUTURE FAMILIES NW, LLC, http://www.futurefamiliesnw.com/aboutus.html (last visited July 22, 2014); About Us, GREATEST GIFT SURROGACY CENTER NW,
http://ggscnw.com/about-us/ (last visited July 22, 2014).
REPROD.
MED.,
100. See,
e.g.,
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
OR.
http://www.oregonreproductivemedicine.com/main-faq (last visited July 22, 2014).
101. See Lewin, supra note 20, at 14.
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one another through websites, much like internet-based dating. 102
Moreover, if they decided to pursue traditional surrogacy, they would
not even need the assistance of a doctor 103 and could even forego
entering into a contract, thus circumventing the clinic and attorney
screening. But this does not necessarily make the state of affairs in
Oregon inferior to that in states with detailed statutory regimes in place.
After all, those statutory regimes typically allow someone who cannot or
does not wish to meet the criteria to “opt out,” the consequence being
simply that they cannot rely on the automatic enforceability and
parentage provisions. In a state such as Oregon, opting out potentially
means being denied the assistance of the small handful of intermediaries
whose assistance is often crucial for a successful surrogacy journey.
D.

A Closer Look at the Matching Process: The Search for a
Surrogate and an Egg Donor

After doing our due diligence, we settled on Oregon and began the
process of being matched with a surrogate. We selected a small agency
in Oregon run by two women who had been surrogate mothers and egg
donors on several occasions. As two men about to engage in a process
that some view as exploitative of women in general or lower income
women in particular, we were drawn to the fact that these women had
themselves served as surrogates and seemed to be interested in making
sure that both the surrogates and the intended parents were treated fairly.
They accomplished this by keeping their own overhead and in turn their
fees low—they worked out of their own homes and not in a fancy office
building—while compensating the surrogates at rates comparable to
those at other agencies both within and outside the state.
The process of matching intended parents and surrogates is an
idiosyncratic one designed to ensure compatibility. The agency needed
enough information about us as a couple that the prospective surrogates
could decide whether they felt comfortable carrying a child for us. For
surrogates—at least those that pass the psychological screening
process—this is about more than just compensation; it is about helping a
couple that they truly feel comfortable helping to become parents.
Surrogates can thus screen out intended parents for any reason, including
based on such characteristics as the age, religion, or sexual orientation of
102. See, e.g., Surrogate Mothers Online: Virtual Classifieds, SURROGATE MOTHERS ONLINE,
http://www.surromomsonline.com/classifieds/index.htm (last visited June 19, 2014).
103. See Anthony Miller, Baseline, Bright-Line, Best Interests: A Pragmatic Approach for
California to Provide Certainty in Determining Parentage, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 637, 671 (2003).
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the intended parents, their plans for childcare (daycare versus nanny
versus stay-at-home parent) or even their favorite color or television
show.
Beyond filling out this dating-style profile, we had to decide whether
we were seeking to match with a traditional or a gestational surrogate, as
well as whether we wanted to be matched with an experienced or a firsttime surrogate. The biggest advantages of selecting a traditional
surrogate and a first-time surrogate are cost. Traditional surrogacy costs
approximately $30,000 less because it avoids both the expenses of
compensating a third-party donor for her eggs and the medical fees
associated with in vitro fertilization, while first-time surrogates are
compensated approximately $5,000 to $10,000 less than experienced
ones. Yet like many intended parents pursuing surrogacy, our biggest
fear was that the surrogate would decide for some reason to retain
custody of the child, and thus the extra expenses associated with
selecting gestational surrogacy and an experienced surrogate were an
insurance policy against this risk that was worth the premium.
With an experienced surrogate, you know that she has been through
and thus can handle the complex legal, medical, and emotional aspects
of surrogacy, including allowing the intended parents to take custody of
the child to whom she gives birth. And with gestational surrogacy, the
surrogate lacks the genetic link that—when coupled with gestation—
makes traditional surrogacy a riskier proposition, since the woman is
giving away what in a very real sense is her child. Accordingly, even
jurisdictions that are otherwise “surrogacy friendly” differentiate
between gestational and traditional surrogacy, treating the latter as more
akin to a woman giving a child up for adoption who can change her
mind up to and shortly after birth and thus not determining parentage
pre-birth. 104 Due to the psychological and legal complexities associated
with the merger of genetics and gestation, ever since medical science has
been able to separate gestational from genetic motherhood, gestational
surrogacy has become the preferred method for surrogates and intended
parents alike. 105
104. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 898–901 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
105. See, e.g., Gaia Bernstein, Unintended Consequences: Prohibitions on Gamete Donor
Anonymity and the Fragile Practice of Surrogacy, 10 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 291, 296–97 (2013);
Kim Willoughby, ART: Enter the Lawyer, 32 FAM. ADVOC., Spring 2010, at 36, 37–38; Using a
Surrogate Mother: What You Need to Know, WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/infertility-andreproduction/guide/using-surrogate-mother (last visited Oct. 27, 2014). In this regard, the biblical
story of Sarah, Abraham, and Hagar was a cautionary tale so far as traditional surrogacy is
concerned. While Hagar became pregnant and gave birth, she did not really want to give up the
child and Sarah became jealous of Hagar, and after Sarah was miraculously cured of her infertility
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Next, we had to answer a series of four questions that the agency said
were critical to making a good match. First, what type of relationship did
we want with the surrogate during the process: did we want to attend
every appointment, be present for the birth and be in regular contact, or
did we want a more arm’s length relationship? Second, what type of
relationship did we want with the surrogate after the child was born: did
we want her to be like an extended member of the family, have no
contact post-birth, or something in between? Third, how many embryos
did we want to transfer at a time? Fourth, what are our views on abortion
due to the discovery of a birth defect during the pregnancy? Or an
abortion through the process of “selective reduction” whereby multiple
embryos are transferred and if more than are desired successfully
implant, the excess ones are aborted. The only “right” answers to these
questions, they stressed, were honest answers, since discovery of a
difference of opinion on any of these can lead to tensions and conflict.
Of all these questions, the abortion question is perhaps the most
challenging one to grapple with. It is the one most likely to result in a
serious conflict between a surrogate and intended parents. 106 People have
a hard time sorting out their own views on abortion, and indeed many
couples do not completely see eye-to-eye on the issue. Yet we not only
had to come to terms with this issue individually and as a couple, but we
also had to find a surrogate with similar views on the issue. Moreover,
this all had to be done in the abstract, not knowing how we would feel in
the moment should we be confronted with such a decision.
With our surrogate search underway, we now had to turn our attention
to the other half of the equation: finding an egg donor. We had already
selected a reproductive medicine clinic in Oregon, and although we were
free to find an egg donor on our own or through an independent agency,
they had their own in-house egg donor program. In addition to searching
for a specific egg donor, we had several other difficult decisions to
make, some of which overlapped with the questions asked by the
surrogacy agency. Did we want to transfer one or multiple embryos, and
would we choose to selectively reduce if more than the desired number
implanted? Would only one of us be contributing the sperm used to
create the embryos, or did they want us to fertilize half of the eggs with
sperm from each of us and implant one embryo fertilized by each of us
in the surrogate (or select a single embryo at random)? Did we want to

and bore a child herself, she banished Hagar and the son she bore. See Genesis 16:4–16, 21:1–14.
106. See, e.g., Elizabeth Cohen, Surrogate Offered $10,000 to Abort Baby, CNN HEALTH (Mar.
6, 2013, 2:58 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/04/health/surrogacy-kelley-legal-battle/.
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pick an egg donor and go through the process right away, freeze the
embryos, and then thaw them once we found a surrogate? Or did we
want to wait until we found a surrogate and then do a “fresh” cycle in
which the menstrual cycles of the two women are coordinated, the eggs
extracted and fertilized from the donor and then implanted into the
surrogate? Did we want the embryos tested for genetic abnormalities
(which also happened to test for the sex of the embryos)?
Having answered this new set of inquiries, we were ready to begin the
search for an egg donor within the clinic’s in-house program. While egg
donation can occur with a known donor, it is far more common for it to
occur anonymously, with the intended parents having photographs of the
donor, her medical and personal history as well as that of her family, and
her answers to a series of questions designed to give the intended parents
insight into her personality.
On the one hand, the search for an egg donor is far easier than the
search for a surrogate: the clinic had an electronic searchable database in
which you could enter desired criteria—such as eye color, hair color,
ethnicity, whether they had successfully donated eggs in the past, and
even sexual orientation—and it would bring up results, akin to a dating
website. But unlike with dating websites or the surrogate matching
process, this is a one-way match: egg donors do not know anything
about the individuals or couples that will receive the eggs, and at least at
our clinic, could not limit the categories or types of individuals or
couples that their eggs could go to. Thus, as long as we were happy with
a given egg donor’s profile, we could just pick her and she would be
matched with us.
Yet on the other hand, the search for an egg donor is so much harder
than the search for a surrogate because this person will be contributing
half of the genetic makeup of your future child. Although those who
have not gone through the process might assume that intended parents
are focused primarily on the egg donor’s looks and intellect, for us the
egg donor’s personal and family medical history took center stage. 107
Indeed, the amount of medical history we were given resulted in near
decision-making paralysis. How could we live with ourselves if we
picked an egg donor with a bee allergy, a grandfather who died of heart
disease, a grandmother who died of breast cancer, or a father who had
107. A recent study indicates that recipients of egg donation are increasingly interested in a
donor’s health, intelligence, and athletic ability, and decreasingly interested in whether or not the
donor resembles the recipient or is from the same gene pool. See Homero Flores et. al., Beauty,
Brains, or Health: Trends in Ovum Recipient Preferences, 23 J. WOMEN’S HEALTH 830, 832–33
(2014).
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diabetes and our future child was diagnosed with one of those ailments
at some point down the road?
Those who have not gone through the process of egg donation may
also be under the impression that there is a great deal of price
discrimination based on the looks, intelligence, or ethnicity of the egg
donor. There are certainly plenty of news stories that sensationalize this
belief as well as the occasional private advertisement by intended
parents offering large sums of money to Ivy League egg donors. 108 Yet
the truth is that at reputable agencies, there is no price discrimination
except for a modest premium for those who have successfully donated
eggs once before.
Although the absence of price discrimination is in part grounded in
law, it is primarily a result of self-regulation by the fertility industry. No
federal law regulates compensation to those who donate eggs for fertility
purposes, and only a handful of state laws in any way regulate egg donor
compensation under these circumstances. 109 Specifically, Louisiana law
prohibits any compensation to any egg donors, 110 Indiana law makes it a
crime to compensate an egg donor more than $4,000 plus expenses, 111
and Florida law provides that “[o]nly reasonable compensation” is
permitted. 112 Nevada law, while not setting any specific limit on the
amount of compensation, provides that the amount cannot be tied to the
“purported quality or genome-related traits of the gametes of
embryos.” 113 The more significant restriction on the amount of
compensation given to egg donors are the ethical guidelines of the
American Society of Reproductive Medicine, which are binding on all

108. See, e.g., Melinda Henneberger, The Ultimate Easter Egg Hunt: ‘Ivy League Couple’ Seeks
Donor with ‘Highest Scores’, WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
she-the-people/wp/2013/03/21/the-ultimate-easter-egg-hunt-ivy-league-couple-seeks-donor-withhighest-percentile-scores/; Gina Kolata, $50,000 Offered to Tall, Smart Egg Donor, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar.
3,
1999),
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/03/us/50000-offered-to-tall-smart-eggdonor.html; Kevin Su, Not by the Dozen, YALE HERALD (Feb. 21, 2014), http://yaleherald.com/
news-and-features/not-by-the-dozen/.
109. Some states prohibit compensation when eggs are to be used for medical research, but not
when donated for fertility purposes. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125350 (West,
Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess. ch. 531); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111L, § 8(b) (West,
Westlaw through 2014 2d Annual Sess. ch. 283). Arizona law does not prohibit compensation for
egg donors but requires health warnings to be given to them. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 361701 to 36-1703 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Reg. & 2d Special Sess.).
110. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:122 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.).
111. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-5-3 (West, Westlaw through 2d Reg. Sess. & 2d Technical
Sess. 2014).
112. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.14 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sp. “A” Sess.).
113. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.810(2) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. & Special Sess.).
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member clinics of its affiliated organization, the Society for Assisted
Reproductive Technology. Under those guidelines, compensation in
excess of $5,000 requires “justification” and compensation in excess of
$10,000 is “not appropriate.” 114 Indeed, so influential are those
guidelines that they are currently the subject of a class action lawsuit
brought on behalf of egg donors claiming that they violate federal
antitrust laws. 115
As intended parents seeking out a surrogate and egg donor, not only
do you have to make decisions that can dictate your child’s future, but
you often have to do so under time pressure. On multiple occasions, we
would receive a profile from our surrogacy agency or a new egg donor
profile would pop up in the clinic’s database, and before we had a
chance to make a decision—often as quickly as 24 hours later—the
surrogate or egg donor would no longer be available because another set
of intended parents had been more decisive.
A couple of months into our search, we were matched with a
surrogate located in Portland, Oregon. Our surrogate was unmarried and
had previously served as a traditional surrogate, which made her the
ideal surrogate from the standpoint of intended parents who harbored the
typical fear that a surrogate and her husband might have a change of
heart and decide to keep the child. As an unmarried woman there was no
husband entitled to the presumption of paternity, meaning that even if
she for some reason were to try to retain custody, at least the genetic
father between us would be able to establish legal paternity. Moreover, if
she was able to give up custody in a situation in which she was both the
genetic and gestational mother, doing so when she was solely the
gestational mother would seem to be a foregone conclusion. The
matching process consisted of us liking one another’s profiles, followed
by a telephone conference, and finally an in-person meeting with her and
her son. As with dating, we later learned that the reason she chose to
match with us was idiosyncratic: a picture of my partner and me at
Disney World holding hands with the Disney characters “Chip” and
“Dale” that was included in our profile had sold her on us.
Soon after matching, our surrogate was hospitalized with what turned
out to be a serious thyroid condition. The condition required radioactive
iodine treatment that would make pregnancy unsafe for the resulting
114. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Ethics Committee Report: Financial Compensation of Oocyte
Donors, 88 FERTILITY & STERILITY 305, 308 (2007).
115. See Kamakahi v. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., No. C 11-01781 SBA, 2013 WL 1768706
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2013). If my biological clock ticking was not enough of a motivator to move
ahead quickly with the process, the prospect of a successful antitrust lawsuit certainly was!
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child for six to eight months following the treatment. In her message to
us, she wrote that if we preferred not to wait and instead match with
another surrogate, she would understand, and ended that sentence with a
sad-face emoticon. Our agency gave us the option of matching with
someone else but we felt so comfortable with her that we decided we
would rather delay the process than start the matching process over from
scratch. And just as with the idiosyncratic nature of the “Chip ‘n’ Dale”
photograph, there was something about that sad-face emoticon that made
our decision clear.
Our surrogate’s recovery period gave us ample time to match with a
suitable egg donor. Like our surrogate, our egg donor was also an
unmarried woman from Portland, Oregon. We initially preferred to have
an experienced egg donor since we would know something about her
fertility, but could not find an experienced egg donor whose profile
clicked with us, and so we ultimately selected a first-time egg donor
whose medical history and other traits made her the ideal match for us.
E.

Straddling the Columbia

With our surrogate and egg donor selected, it was time to get the
lawyers involved in the process. In addition to hiring a lawyer to
represent us, we had to pay the legal fees of the attorneys independently
selected by both the egg donor and the surrogate to represent them.
The contract with the egg donor was fairly straightforward, and
indeed was a form contract that the clinic had drafted by an attorney for
use in its in-house egg donor program. There were three key aspects of
the contract. First, that the donor acquired neither parental rights nor
responsibilities over any children born as a result of the donation.
Second, that if the donor subsequently experienced any significant major
changes in family medical history she would convey that information to
us via the clinic so that our child would have a complete medical history.
And third, that if the child resulting from the egg donation suffered from
any medical or psychological conditions that might be genetically linked
to the egg donor, we would convey that information to the donor via the
clinic so that she could make informed decisions regarding having
children of her own in the future.
In contrast, the surrogacy contract was somewhat more complex. As
an initial matter, fully circumventing both Washington’s criminal and
civil law regarding surrogacy would require care and planning.
Washington State does not, as a general matter, purport to apply its
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criminal law to the conduct of its citizens that takes place wholly outside
of the state, 116 and even if it did, it is doubtful that doing so would be
consistent with the limits of due process. 117 This meant, however, that to
avoid liability, we could not “enter into” 118 the contract within the
territorial boundaries of the state, meaning that unlike the egg donor
contract—which we reviewed and signed in Washington State—we
would have to travel to Oregon to sign the contract. Indeed, throughout
the entire surrogacy process, I felt a weight come off my shoulders each
time I crossed the Columbia River that serves as the border between
Washington State and Oregon.
Circumventing Washington’s civil law on surrogacy would take
somewhat more planning. While we could easily avoid criminal liability
by taking care to ensure that the contract was not entered into within the
state, the civil aspect of Washington’s surrogacy law addressed not
formation but subsequent enforcement of surrogacy contracts, declaring
such contracts to be “void and unenforceable in the state of
Washington.” 119 Moreover, even if the contract was entered into out-ofstate, the civil provision made clear that it applied to all such contracts,
“whether executed in the state of Washington or in another
jurisdiction.” 120 This meant that if a surrogate gave birth in Washington
State, the contract would not be enforceable. In addition, on our
attorney’s advice—which was consistent with my thinking as someone
who has taught Conflict of Laws—we did not consider matching with
surrogates who resided in Washington State, even if they were willing to
relocate to Oregon in the final weeks of pregnancy. This is because our
joint status as citizens of Washington State might be problematic even if
enforcement were sought in Oregon, since in a conflict-of-laws analysis
a court in Oregon might apply Washington law and declare the contract
invalid even if it would be valid under the state’s own laws and even if
we had a choice of law clause in our contract.121
116. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.04.030 (2012).
117. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822–25 (1975). But see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., If Roe
Were Overruled: Abortion and the Constitution in a Post-Roe World, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 611,
626–40 (2007) (contending that the due process limitation is not entirely clear cut, and considering
other constitutional limitations on extraterritorial application of a state’s criminal law).
118. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.230 (2012). We, and anyone else involved, also could not
“induce, arrange, procure, or otherwise assist in the formation of” such a contract within the state.
Id.
119. Id. § 26.26.240.
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., Hodas v. Morin, 814 N.E.2d 320, 324–27 (Mass. 2004) (engaging in a conflict-oflaws analysis to decide whether to give effect to parties’ choice-of-law provision in surrogacy
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On the other hand, upon completion of the surrogacy process in
Oregon, it was clear that Washington would recognize the newly created
parent-child relationship. If our parentage was established by means of a
judicial proceeding in Oregon, Washington would be obliged under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause to recognize the judgment. 122 Moreover, as
one of us would be the genetic parent of the child, that parent could sign
an acknowledgment of paternity in Oregon, and Washington law would
give that acknowledgement full legal effect.123 Finally, even if the outof-court judicial proceedings only established the non-parentage of the
surrogate and the parentage of the genetic father, because we were
registered domestic partners, by operation of Washington law the other
partner would likewise be deemed a legal parent under one of several
statutory provisions enacted by the legislature in 2011, 124 the same year
in which it tried but failed to repeal the criminal prohibition on
surrogacy. 125 First, the legislature expanded the ancient presumption of
paternity—whereby a husband is presumed to be the father of any
children born to his wife—to same-sex relationships. 126 Second, the
legislature further provided that a person is presumed to be the parent of
a child if, for the first two years of the child’s life, he resides in the same
house as the child and holds him out as his own. 127 Third, the legislature
provided that a person who consents to assisted reproduction by his
domestic partner that results in the birth of a child is the legal parent of
the child. 128 These three 129 provisions meant that it is not necessary in
Washington State for the non-biological partner to adopt the child to
establish legal parentage, although to ensure recognition in less gaycontract); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 187(2)(b), 188(2) (1971).
122. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; Baker by Thomas v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232–
33 (1998); Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1151–56 (10th Cir. 2007); Henry v. Himes, No.
1:14-CV-129, 2014 WL 1418395, at *17, *18 n.24 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 2014), rev’d on other
grounds sub nom. DeBoer v. Snyder, Nos.14-1341, 3057, 3464, 5291, 5297, 5818, 2014 WL
5748990 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2014); Embry v. Ryan, 11 So. 3d 408, 409–10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
123. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.350.
124. See Act of May 11, 2011, ch. 283, 2011 Wash. Sess. Laws 1758 (codified at WASH. REV.
CODE ch. 26.26).
125. See Terry J. Price, The Future of Compensated Surrogacy in Washington State: Anytime
Soon?, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1311, 1326−36 (2014).
126. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.26.101(5), 26.26.116(1)(a).
127. See id. §§ 26.26.101(5), 26.26.116(2).
128. See id. §§ 26.26.101(7), 26.26.710, 26.26.715, 26.26.720.
129. A fourth provision indicates that a person who is an intended parent in a “valid surrogate
parentage” contract is also a legal parent, but that provision—which cross-references the statutory
provisions governing surrogacy for a definition of validity—was not available to us. See id.
§ 26.26.101(8).
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friendly states some sort of judicial decree that would be entitled to Full
Faith and Credit would be needed, such as an order adjudicating
parentage based on one of the above statutory provisions. 130
Our surrogacy agreement was thus carefully drafted to address the
above concerns, as well as many others designed to protect the wellbeing of the child that would be born as a result of the agreement. Thus,
under the terms of the contract, our surrogate agreed that she would not
have any parental rights or responsibilities with respect to the child, and
that she would cooperate in obtaining a PBO establishing our legal
parentage. She also agreed to the following list of restrictions, among
others: (1) not to travel outside of Oregon in her last trimester of
pregnancy; (2) not to smoke, drink alcohol, or use illegal drugs; and (3)
not to consume raw fish, food or drink containing artificial sweeteners,
or more than one cup of caffeinated beverage per day. She also agreed—
within the confines of what she considered to be acceptable reasons for
procuring an abortion—to undergo an abortion at our request if one of
those situations she deemed acceptable arose, and also agreed not to
undergo an abortion against our wishes unless necessary to protect her
health. In other words—and within limits set by her—she delegated her
fundamental right to abort or not abort to us. While this last provision
may seem shocking to some, in a sense it is consistent with why the U.S.
Supreme Court recognized the abortion decision to be a fundamental
right in the first instance: that restricting the right to an abortion may
thrust unwanted maternity and its attendant harms to the pregnant
woman. 131 Since the remainder of the contract made clear that we, not
the surrogate, would take on parental responsibilities of any child born to
her as a result of the arrangement, there was a certain degree of logic in
her likewise transferring her abortion right to us. Moreover, she was still
exercising her fundamental right, in the sense that she was agreeing to
have or not have an abortion on terms acceptable to her. The contract did
not contemplate specific performance, and at least some states explicitly
declare such provisions in surrogacy contracts unenforceable, 132 but in
130. See id. § 26.26.625. In a similar vein, courts in New York have held that where one partner
in a same-sex couple is the genetic father of a child born to a surrogate in India, the fact that the
underlying surrogacy arrangement would be a crime in New York was no bar to allowing the other
partner to adopt the child. See In re Adoption of J.J., 984 N.Y.S.2d 841 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2014).
131. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
132. A handful of states have provisions that restrict abortion-related provisions in surrogacy
contracts. Specifically, Texas and Utah law provide that surrogacy agreements cannot limit the
surrogate’s right to make decisions to safeguard the health of the embryo or fetus. See TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 160.754(g) (West, Westlaw through 3d Called Sess. 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B15-808(2) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Gen. Sess.).
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my mind surrogacy contracts are less about enforceability and more a
vehicle for having conversations about difficult topics and making sure
that everyone is on the same page. In fact, since our surrogacy agency
had already pre-screened us all on the abortion issue, this provision
generated no back-and-forth during the contract negotiation process.
Rather, we spent most of our time discussing a provision regarding our
surrogate’s handling of cat litter!
Of course, the surrogacy contract also imposed obligations upon us.
We agreed to take custody of any child our surrogate bore pursuant to
the agreement. While this may not seem like much of an obligation on
intended parents, it is protective of the surrogate. On occasion, a child
will be born with a serious medical condition or the intended parents will
break up and may not wish to take custody of the child.133 The
surrogate’s interest in not becoming an unintended parent is thus one
that needs protection. In addition, we agreed to pay all of her medical
expenses associated with the surrogacy process, her health insurance
premiums, 134 her maternity clothing expenses, housekeeping and
childcare expenses, a fee for undergoing an embryo transfer, and her
compensation for serving as a surrogate. While it is often assumed that
this last item is paid to the surrogate only upon relinquishment of the
child to the intended parents, that is not the case: the surrogate is paid
that fee for the physical process of gestating and the attendant pain and
suffering, and thus receives that fee in ten monthly installments during
the term of the pregnancy. Accordingly, she is entitled to the
compensation even if, say, she miscarries late in the pregnancy.
Other provisions in the surrogacy contract are designed to address
various eventualities should they arise. We agreed to name guardians for
our children in our wills in the event that we died before the surrogate
gave birth. We agreed to purchase a life insurance policy for our
surrogate to protect her child’s financial well-being in the event that she
died for any reason while pregnant. We also agreed to pay additional
compensation for each additional fetus that she carried, as well as
compensation in the event that she had to undergo a C-Section or
suffered partial or full loss of her reproductive function. These last two
133. See Lewin, supra note 20, at A1; Hollie McKay, Can Sherri Shepherd Walk Away from
Unborn Surrogate Child?, FOX NEWS (July 22, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/entertainment/
2014/07/22/can-sherri-shepherd-walk-away-from-unborn-surrogate-child/.
134. State laws vary widely on whether a surrogate’s health insurance will cover the medical
expenses associated with a surrogate birth, with some courts upholding decisions by insurers not to
cover such expenses, see, e.g., Spectrum Health Hosp. v. Lehr, No. 298688, 2011 WL 3962997
(Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2011), and others holding that insurers cannot exclude maternity coverage
for surrogates, see, e.g., MercyCare Ins. Co. v. Wis. Comm’r of Ins., 786 N.W.2d 785 (Wis. 2010).
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items, to my mind, have a shockingly low “market” value, with the
going rate of compensation in the United States being only $3,000 for
the former and $5,000 for the latter. 135
In cases involving challenges to state laws prohibiting same-sex
marriage, one of the “rational bases” offered in support of limiting
marriage to opposite-sex couples is that since same-sex couples have to
go through so much care and planning to have children, they are not as
much in need of the protections of marriage as are opposite-sex couples,
whose natural procreation is often unplanned and thus the resulting
children need the protections that come automatically with marriage. 136
Having gone through so much care and planning to become a parent via
surrogacy, and despite my strong belief that prohibitions on same-sex
marriage are unconstitutional, I was starting to become reluctantly
convinced that—at least under rational basis review—this was not such a
bad defense of such laws!
Our surrogacy contract was drafted, negotiated, and signed within
Oregon, and set forth criteria designed to prevent ever having to enforce
the contract within Washington State. We had thus successfully
circumvented Washington State’s criminal prohibition on compensated
surrogacy agreements, while at the same time laying the groundwork for
having our parent-child relationship recognized by Washington State.
F.

Becoming Pregnant and Giving Birth

With the legal formalities complete, it was time to get started with the
process of creating human life. In general, the surrogacy process is
unregulated by the federal government. However, because the process of
in vitro fertilization involves the transfer of human tissue—specifically a
sperm and egg—from one pair of people to another person, reproductive
medicine clinics are required to follow federal regulations issued by the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration. 137
Pursuant to those regulations, before transferring a fertilized embryo
to the surrogate, the donors of the sperm and egg must be tested for a
135. See, e.g., Anticipated Expenses, supra note 90; Surrogacy Procedure, COASTAL
SURROGACY, http://www.coastalsurrogacy.com/sg_par_costs.php (last visited Oct. 27, 2014);
GENERATIONS,
Surrogate
Benefit
Package—Gestational
Surrogacy,
GROWING
http://www.growinggenerations.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Sample-BP-for-GG_
Website_20130815.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2014).
136. See Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1111–13 (D. Haw. 2012); Hernandez v.
Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006); Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 23–24 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005).
137. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 1271.1–1271.90 (2014).
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variety of communicable diseases, including HIV, at or within seven
days of when the sperm and egg are retrieved from the donors. 138 In
addition, the donors of the sperm and egg are required to answer a series
of questions designed to identify whether their “social behavior”
includes “risk factors” for communicable diseases. 139 The regulations
themselves do not specify what constitute “risk factors,” but technically
non-binding “guidance” 140 issued by the FDA includes among the list of
risk factors that the sperm donor has had sex with another man in the
preceding 5 years. 141
Despite the fact that my partner and I tested negative for HIV and
numerous other communicable diseases multiple times both before and
after the clinic collected and froze sperm for use in the in vitro
fertilization process, because of the positive question regarding sex with
another man in the preceding five years, the FDA requires the sperm
sample to be labeled with a “[b]iohazard” warning label 142 and the
phrase “WARNING: Advise recipient of communicable disease
risks.” 143 Moreover, the sperm donor is deemed ineligible, 144 meaning
that his sperm cannot be implanted into another person. 145 In contrast to
this five year period of ineligibility for sexually active gay men, the
FDA guidelines impose only a twelve-month period of ineligibility for
those other than gay men who have had sexual intercourse with someone
who is HIV positive or have otherwise been exposed to an HIV infection
risk, or who have undergone tattooing or body piercing using non-sterile
equipment. 146
A small loophole in the FDA regulations nonetheless permits but
strongly discourages people in the position of our surrogate from moving
ahead with the process even if a clinic has determined someone to be an
ineligible donor under the regulations. Pursuant to those regulations, if
the sperm donor is a “directed reproductive donor”—meaning that the
138. See id. § 1271.80(a), (b); id. § 1271.85(a), (c).
139. See id. § 1271.75(a)(1); FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: ELIGIBILITY
DETERMINATION FOR DONORS OF HUMAN CELLS, TISSUES, AND CELLULAR AND TISSUE-BASED
PRODUCTS 14 (2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/BiologicsBloodVaccines/
GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/Tissue/ucm091345.pdf [hereinafter ELIGIBILITY
DETERMINATION FOR DONORS].
140. ELIGIBILITY DETERMINATION FOR DONORS, supra note 139, at 1.
141. Id. at 14.
142. 21 C.F.R. § 1271.90(b)(4)(ii).
143. See id. § 1271.90(b)(3)(ii)(B).
144. See id. § 1271.50.
145. See id. § 1271.45(c).
146. See ELIGIBILITY DETERMINATION FOR DONORS, supra note 139, at 15–16.
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sperm donor and the recipient knew one another prior to the donation
taking place 147—the transfer can proceed. 148 To invoke this loophole, we
and our surrogate were required to sign two documents provided to us by
the clinic. The first was entitled “Statement of Relationship,” in which
we confirmed that we had met at least once in person, thus establishing
that we were “known” to one another. And the second was entitled
“Communicable Disease Testing/Risk Factor Waiver,” in which the
surrogate acknowledged that she was at an increased risk of becoming
infected with HIV or various other communicable diseases because the
sperm was from a man who has had sex with another man. We were
fortunate our clinic was willing to do this, as some clinics use the FDA’s
guidance as a basis for refusing to provide reproductive services to any
gay men. 149
After a long wait and plenty of paperwork, our surrogate and egg
donor were medically cleared to proceed with the process. Because we
were proceeding with a “fresh” transfer, the two women began taking
medications designed to synchronize their menstrual cycles, since the
surrogate would need to be at the right point in her cycle for the embryo
to implant following the extraction and fertilization of eggs from the egg
donor. In addition, the egg donor began taking medications that would
help stimulate the maturation and release of multiple eggs. Over the
course of approximately a one-month period, both our surrogate and egg
donor would make regular visits to the clinic. During that month, I often
wondered if the paths of these two women from Portland—who did not
know one another—ever crossed.
The days leading up to the day when the eggs would be extracted
from our donor were nerve-wracking. Since she was a first-time donor
who did not have children of her own, she lacked a fertility track record,
and there was thus no guarantee that she would produce quality eggs.
Yet the egg donor and the fertility clinic are compensated for their
efforts, not the results, and with this step in the process costing around
$30,000 for the donor and clinic fees combined, it was one that we and
most intended parents could ill afford to repeat a second or third time.
On retrieval day, we received a call notifying us that they had

147. See 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(l).
148. See id. § 1271.65(b)(ii).
149. See Leland Traiman, Guidelines But No Guidance: Gayspermbank.com vs. FDA, 9 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 613, 614–15 (2006); Beth Littrell, Fertility Industry Bias Against Gays and
Lesbians, Opinion, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2011, 11:31 AM), http://www.nytimes.com/
roomfordebate/2011/09/13/making-laws-about-making-babies/fertility-industry-victimizes-gaysand-lesbians.
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retrieved nearly thirty eggs! That did not mean, however, that we would
have that many embryos, as some eggs are too immature to be fertilized,
some, though mature, fail to fertilize, and those that successfully are
fertilized stop growing before they can be implanted or frozen. We
ultimately ended up with five embryos. The doctor—after following
careful protocol to ensure that the embryos in fact belonged to us and not
some other couple 150—implanted one of those in our surrogate, and
subsequently froze four others for possible future use. 151
Soon thereafter, a positive pregnancy was confirmed, first by our
surrogate using a home pregnancy test and then several weeks later by
the doctor by performing an ultrasound. From that point forward, the
pregnancy was for the most part no different than any other pregnancy,
save for a couple of key differences for which there were creative
workarounds.
First, despite the relatively long drive, we were able to make sure at
least one of us was able to attend all of the ultrasounds. One of the
challenges when attending an ultrasound with a surrogate—as opposed
to one’s wife—is that the process requires the woman to be in a certain
state of undress, which is awkward in what otherwise has developed as
an arm’s length relationship. Yet medical providers in Portland seemed
familiar enough with the surrogacy process to have a solution, a
“modesty” shield that allowed the intended parents to see the ultrasound
monitor while shielding the surrogate’s body from view.
Second, one of the miracles of nature is that when a baby is born, she

150. It is quite rare to have an embryo transfer error, but it does happen. See, e.g., Perry-Rogers v.
Fasano, 715 N.Y.S.2d 19, 25 & n.2 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (holding that custody of a child born as a
result of such an error belongs to the intended parents rather than the gestating woman and her
husband, but noting that things might have been different had a great deal of time passed before the
error was discovered).
151. When couples that have created embryos together via in vitro fertilization divorce, disputes
sometimes arise regarding the disposition of those embryos. Some courts have held that these cases
involve a balancing of competing fundamental rights: the fundamental right of one spouse to
procreate versus the fundamental right of the other not to procreate, with the courts often ruling in
favor of the spouse seeking not to procreate, particularly if the other spouse still has a viable way to
otherwise procreate. See In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 780 (Iowa 2003); J.B. v. M.B.,
783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992). Other courts have
held that the fundamental right not to procreate is sufficiently strong that prior written agreements
regarding the disposition of embryos are unenforceable. See A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass.
2000). However, some courts say that such agreements should generally be binding. See Kass v.
Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998); Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. App. 2006); Litowitz v.
Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002); Szafranski v. Dunston, 993 N.E.2d 502 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)
(noting that even fundamental rights can be waived by contract). Because of this risk, the clinic we
used requires all couples to sign documents declaring our intent for disposition of the embryos in
the event of a subsequent divorce.
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is able to recognize the voice of her gestational mother as well as anyone
else who lived with her. We learned that in cases of surrogacy or the
adoption of newborns, the inability to recognize any familiar voices
sometimes resulted in some degree of psychological anxiety for newborn
children. 152 Our solution was for my partner and me to each record our
voices reading bedtime stories to our future child and upload them to an
MP3 player. We sent that, along with a pair of “belly buds”—speakers
that a woman can attach directly to her stomach—to our surrogate, who
played them to our child regularly during the last trimester, when
children in utero can both hear and remember voices around them.
Third, partway through the third trimester, our attorney filed a
declaratory judgment action in a state court in Portland, seeking to have
parentage established pre-birth. Our surrogate, through her attorney and
consistent with our contractual agreement, consented to the issuance of
the order, and with our future child still in utero, a judge issued an order
declaring our intended parentage and directing the state Department of
Health to issue a birth certificate post-birth that reflected that state of
affairs.
Finally, in the last month of pregnancy, our surrogate started to have
contractions. Of course, each time this happened it was not a quick drive
down the street but instead a nearly 200-mile drive to Portland. The first
time was a false alarm, then after a hiatus from contractions of about a
week, we received a call from our surrogate just after eleven o’clock at
night that she was on her way back to the hospital. Things moved
quickly, and unfortunately we were not able to make it to Portland in
time for the birth (for which I will continue to harbor resentment at the
drafters of Washington’s surrogacy law for some time to come). But our
surrogate’s doula was kind enough to call at the moment of birth and
play the sound of our daughter’s first cry over the car’s speakerphone.
At the hospital, everything went smoothly. Our surrogate was holding
our daughter for us, with her doula and son present to keep her company.
Our attorney had already faxed the court order to the hospital, which had
a separate room next to our surrogate’s room for us and our daughter.
Our surrogate checked out of the hospital about twelve hours later and
returned to her pre-surrogacy life. We spent a few nights at the hospital
learning the ropes of feeding and changing, and then it was back to
Seattle to begin our new adventure as parents.

152. See, e,g., Gail Steinberg & Beth Hall, Bonding and Attachment: How Does Adoption Affect a
Newborn?, PACT’S POINT OF VIEW, http://www.pactadopt.org/app/servlet/documentapp.Display
Document?DocID=235 (last visited Oct. 27, 2014).
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Legally Motherless

In general, our experience as new parents is no different than that of
other couples: sleepless nights, lots of diaper changes, and countless
photos of adorable moments in our daughter’s daily life. Nonetheless, as
a male couple we encountered a few practical and legal challenges along
the way.
For starters, in every pre-birth class we took or parenting book we
read, we were bombarded with the message “breast is best,” referring to
the campaign to encourage parents to feed their children breast milk, not
formula, due to the many health benefits of the former. These messages
made us (and the many women who are physically unable to produce
sufficient breast milk) feel guilty, for we were cognizant of the fact that
no matter how hard either of us tried to mother, the limitations of nature
would prevent either of us from producing breast milk. Wanting our
daughter to receive a good start in life, we broached the topic with our
surrogate, who agreed to pump, freeze, and ship breast milk to us on a
periodic basis. As a result of this arrangement, we were able to provide
her with a partial breast milk diet for almost the first six months of her
life. As with the gestational process, we compensated our surrogate for
her efforts in this regard, yet as with surrogacy, the discomfort of
pumping breast milk is not something a woman goes through solely for
the modest compensation one receives. 153
Second, I was surprised to learn that despite my role as my daughter’s
primary caregiver, I was not entitled to a single day of paid parental
leave at the University of Washington. Under the University’s official
policy, what everyone on campus refers to as paid parental leave is
officially a medical leave of up to twelve weeks to recover from giving
birth. Under this policy, female employees who adopt children (or whose
children are born to a surrogate) and all male employees are denied paid
parental leave, even if they are a child’s primary or sole caregiver. 154
153. Breast milk is currently valued on the private “market” at about $1.00 to $2.50 per ounce
when sold directly between producer and consumer and between $4.00 and $5.00 per ounce when
purchased from private or non-profit milk banks. See Judy Dutton, Liquid Gold: The Booming
Market for Human Breast Milk, WIRED MAG. (May 17, 2011, 10:05 PM), http://www.wired.com/
2011/05/ff_milk/all/.
154. This policy raises a whole host of constitutional questions that are beyond the scope of this
paper. The policy on its face technically discriminates on the basis of pregnancy status and not sex,
and thus is presumptively subject only to rational basis review. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S.
484 (1974). Yet if—as I strongly suspect—its true purpose was to deny paid leave to male
employees, and if evidence of that true purpose could be uncovered, it would be subject to
intermediate scrutiny as a sex-based classification, despite the fact that it also discriminates against
female employees. Cf. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 232 (1985) (“[A]n additional purpose to
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Finally, government agencies still find it hard to grasp the concept of
someone being legally motherless. 155 On more than one occasion I
would be asked by a government agency “where the mother was,” and
when I responded that she had no legal mother, I would get a snide
response, “well she had to come out of somewhere.” Indeed, I am listed
as my daughter’s mother on one Washington State public health record
because their computer system does not allow for the possibility of
someone without a mother. Ironically, thanks to this little bit of
bureaucratic inertia and in spite of Washington State’s efforts to prevent
discriminate against poor whites would not render nugatory the purpose to discriminate against all
blacks.”). Moreover, to the extent that this policy, on its face, denies the bonding time associated
with paid parental leave to a certain class of children, namely, those who are adopted or born via
surrogacy arrangements, it should also be subjected to heightened scrutiny when examined from the
vantage point not of the parents, but instead the children harmed by such a policy. See United States
v. Windsor, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013) (declaring the federal Defense of Marriage
Act unconstitutional, and noting the injuries the law poses to the children of same-sex couples);
Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1983) (noting that heightened scrutiny applies to illegitimacy
classifications, reasoning that it is unjust to punish children for their parent’s conduct); Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982) (applying heightened scrutiny to laws that discriminate against
children of illegal aliens, employing the same logic). In all events, the policy is surprisingly
regressive when compared with other universities, which provide paid leave to any parent, male or
female, and regardless of whether their child is born naturally or the result of surrogacy or adoption,
so long as the parent meets the definition of “primary caregiver.” Examples include Faculty
Parental Leave, SYRACUSE U., HUM. RESOURCES, http://humanresources.syr.edu/resources/
faculty/faculty-parental-leave/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2014); FAQ: Paid Parental Leave, U. OF MD.,
FAC. HANDBOOK, http://www.faculty.umd.edu/faculty/leave_ppl_faq.html (last visited Oct. 19,
2014); Interim Faculty Parental Leave Policy, CASE W. RES. U., https://www.case.edu/
president/facsen/pdfs/Paid_Parental_Leave_interim_policy_Faculty.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2014);
Leaves of Absence for Reasons of Pregnancy, Childbirth, and Child Care, SARAH LAWRENCE C.,
HUM.
RESOURCES,
http://www.slc.edu/offices-services/human-resources/time-off/Childcare_
Leave.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2014); Paid Parental Leave, DUKE U., HUM. RESOURCES,
http://www.hr.duke.edu/policies/time_away/loa/parental.php (last visited Oct. 19, 2014); Parental
Leave, TUFTS U., https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/display/wfb/Parental+leave (last modified
Aug. 26, 2014); Parental Leave, VAND. U., HUM. RESOURCES (July 1, 2014),
http://hr.vanderbilt.edu/policies/ParentalLeave.php; Parental Leave Policy, ADAMS ST. U. 1–4,
http://www.adams.edu/president/parentalleavepolicy.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2014); Parental
Leave Policy–Staff, WASH. & LEE U., HUM. RESOURCES, http://www.wlu.edu/human-resources/
benefits/time-off-leave-and-disability/parental-leave/parental-leave-policy-staff (last visited Oct. 19,
2014); Parental Leave–Staff, WAKE FOREST U., HUM. RESOURCES POLICIES & PROCS. 1 (2013),
http://hr.wfu.edu/files/2013/08/WFU-Section-V-1-Parental-Leave-Staff-8.2.13.pdf (last visited Oct.
19, 2014); Staff Handbook: Other Paid Leaves, WESLEYAN U., HUM. RESOURCES,
http://www.wesleyan.edu/hr/handbook/otherpaid.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2014); Staff Handbook:
Time-Off Benefits & Leave Plans, SMITH C., http://www.smith.edu/hr/handbook_512.php (last
visited Oct. 19, 2014). In all events, I am grateful to the law school’s administration, which made
significant efforts to offset the negative effects of the University’s official leave policy.
155. This same phenomenon appears in some court rulings in which parties are trying to establish
parentage that does not involve a legal mother. See In re Paternity of Infant T., 991 N.E.2d 596,
599–601 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013); In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115, 132 (Md. 2007) (Cathell, J.,
dissenting); id. at 142 (Harrell, J., dissenting); In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 729 (Tenn. 2005).
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compensated surrogacy from taking place, I was—both in a nurturing
sense and at least on one official document—able to accomplish my goal
of becoming a “mother” after all.
II.

THE RIGHT TO PROCREATE VIA SURROGACY

A.

Introduction

One of the more contested areas in federal constitutional law concerns
the ability of federal courts to recognize and enforce unenumerated
“fundamental” rights. Ever since the nation’s founding, Supreme Court
Justices have sparred on the question whether the power to do so even
exists. 156 Moreover, even when the Court has felt empowered to
recognize such rights, Justices have found that power grounded in
different provisions of the Constitution, 157 including the Due Process, 158
Equal Protection, 159 and Privileges or Immunities 160 Clauses, as well as
the “penumbras” of the Bill of Rights 161 and the Ninth Amendment. 162
Indeed, some established fundamental rights—such as the right to
marry—have been grounded in different constitutional provisions in
different cases. 163
Much of the Court’s vacillation in the early-to-mid-twentieth century
amongst various constitutional hooks for recognizing and enforcing
unenumerated “fundamental” rights can be explained as a conscious
effort by the Court to avoid reliance on the Due Process Clause. This is
because invocation of that clause in the economic substantive due
156. Compare Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387–89 (1798) (Opinion of Chase, J.)
(contending that federal courts have the power to strike down a law even if it does not violate a right
expressly enumerated in the U.S. Constitution), with id. at 398–99 (Opinion of Iredell, J.)
(contending that the federal courts can only strike down a law if it violates a right expressly
enumerated in the U.S. Constitution). See generally Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 755–
65 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring).
157. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 755–65 (Souter, J., concurring) (“American constitutional
practice in recognizing unenumerated, substantive limits on governmental action . . . has [not] rested
on any single textual basis.”).
158. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
159. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex. rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
160. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3059–88 (2010) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (identifying privileges or immunities clause as basis for incorporating and applying
Second Amendment against the states); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502–04 (1999) (right to travel).
161. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483–85 (1965).
162. See id. at 487 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
163. Compare Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (Due Process Clause), with Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 382 (1978) (Equal Protection Clause).
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process cases of the so-called Lochner era had only recently been
repudiated by the Court. 164 In general, modern Supreme Court precedent
has since re-characterized most previously recognized fundamental
rights as being grounded in the Due Process Clause even if they were
previously recognized under a different constitutional provision, 165
although a few lines of fundamental rights precedent continue to rely
upon one of the other clauses. 166
If a law infringes upon a fundamental right that has already been
established as such by the U.S. Supreme Court, one can proceed directly
to the application of the appropriate level of scrutiny to determine
whether it passes constitutional muster. Traditionally, laws infringing
upon fundamental rights are said to be subject to strict scrutiny, and will
be upheld only if they are narrowly tailored to further a compelling

164. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups and the Due Process Clause,
55 UCLA L. REV. 99, 112, 123 (2007); G. Edward White, The Anti-Judge: William O. Douglas and
the Ambiguities of Individuality, 74 VA. L. REV. 17, 65–72 (1988).
165. Thus, for example, the right to procreate, although originally recognized as fundamental
under the Equal Protection Clause, see Skinner v. Oklahoma ex. rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535
(1942), has since been re-characterized as being a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause,
see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573–74 (2003); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 846–51 (1992) (joint opinion); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684–85
(1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973).
166. Constitutional scholarship and precedent does recognize one important difference between
fundamental rights protected solely by the Equal Protection Clause and those protected by the Due
Process Clause. If a right is deemed fundamental under the Due Process Clause, infringements upon
that right are subject to heightened scrutiny even if the government is evenhanded and infringes
upon everyone’s ability to exercise that right. In contrast, fundamental rights protected by the Equal
Protection Clause can be infringed upon or even eliminated by the government without raising any
constitutional concerns, so long as it does so evenhandedly; it is only if it infringes upon or denies
the right to some individuals but not others that the government’s conduct is subject to heightened
scrutiny. The right to an abortion is a paradigmatic example of a due process fundamental right:
even if the government is evenhanded in denying the right to everyone, the law is subject to
heightened scrutiny. In contrast, the right to vote is a paradigmatic example of an equal protection
right: the government need not extend that right at all for particular governmental positions, but
once it chooses to extend that right, it must do so evenhandedly, with the failure to do so being
subject to heightened scrutiny. See Patricia A. Cain, Imagine There’s No Marriage, 16 QUINNIPIAC
L. REV. 27, 30–37 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the
Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1168–69
(1988); Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 1375, 1412–20 (2010). Since declaring something to be an equal protection fundamental right
is somewhat weaker medicine than declaring it to be a due process right, in some instances, where
the government is denying an alleged fundamental right to some people but not others, the Court
might invoke the Equal Protection Clause rather than the Due Process Clause, reserving its stronger
medicine for a later point in time in which the government more broadly denies the right at issue.
See Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111–12 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring);
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 543–45 (Stone, C.J., concurring); id. at 546–47 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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governmental interest. 167 However, the Court has explicitly articulated a
lower level of scrutiny—the undue burden test—for laws infringing
upon the fundamental right to obtain an abortion. 168 Moreover, the Court
has recited a test in a case involving the fundamental right to marry that
sounds akin to the intermediate scrutiny employed in the class-based
equal protection context for sex and legitimacy classifications,169 and has
failed to articulate an explicit standard of review in its more recent
fundamental rights cases, 170 leading some lower courts to recognize an
emerging test—at least for some newly recognized fundamental rights—
that seems more akin to intermediate scrutiny. 171 Moreover, unlike in the
class-based equal protection context, where one must show an intent to
discriminate against a given class—not mere discriminatory effects
against a given class—in order to make out a constitutional claim, 172
where fundamental rights are involved, it suffices to show that a law
affects, burdens, or interferes with a fundamental right without showing
an intent specifically to do so. 173
Yet, it is not always clear whether a litigant’s claim falls within the
scope of an existing fundamental right or if instead the litigant is seeking

167. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997); Roe, 410 U.S. at 155–56;
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 497 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
168. Although in its early cases, the Court applied strict scrutiny to laws infringing upon the right
to obtain an abortion, see Roe, 410 U.S. at 155–56, it subsequently replaced it with the undue
burden test, see Casey, 505 U.S. at 874–79 (joint opinion); id. at 929–30 (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part); id. at 964–65 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). A more recent case had language
suggesting that the Court was applying some form of heightened rational basis review. See Gonzales
v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158, 166 (2007); id. at 187 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
169. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383–88 (1978). In another case involving the
fundamental right to marry, the Court applied a heightened form of rational basis review, but that
was because the case involved the special context of constitutional rights in the prison setting. See
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89–91, 96–99 (1987).
170. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority opinion failed
to apply strict scrutiny review); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (noting that the majority opinion failed to articulate the appropriate standard of review,
and contending that it should be strict scrutiny).
171. See Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 51–56 (1st Cir. 2008); Witt v. Dep’t of Air Force, 527 F.3d
806, 817–19 (9th Cir. 2008); cf. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 479–84
(9th Cir. 2014) (in the equal protection context, similarly interpreting the Court’s silence on the
level of scrutiny as applying an intermediate level of review).
172. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–42 (1976).
173. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (joint opinion) (noting, in the abortion context, that either intent
or effect suffice); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (distinguishing laws that “burden” a
fundamental right and those that “target” a suspect class); Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487
U.S. 450, 457–58 (1988) (distinguishing a law that “interferes” with a fundamental right from one
that “discriminates” against a suspect class).
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to establish a new, as-yet unrecognized fundamental right. This is
because a claimed right can be broadly described in a way that makes it
fit within an existing line of fundamental rights precedents, or it can be
narrowly described in a way that sets it apart from previously recognized
fundamental rights. The distinction between the two characterizations is
of critical importance in determining the appropriate level of
constitutional scrutiny to apply to the law. If a court concludes that a
litigant’s claim falls within the scope of an existing fundamental right, it
can simply proceed to apply strict or some other form of heightened
scrutiny to the law. Yet if a court instead concludes that a litigant’s claim
seeks to establish a new fundamental right, it must first determine
whether such a right exists and only if it concludes that it does then
apply some heightened form of scrutiny to the law.
A perfect example of such rights-framing ambiguity exists in the
recent string of cases challenging state laws prohibiting same-sex
marriage. Some courts characterize the right at issue generally as
“marriage,” and proceed to apply the heightened scrutiny employed by
the Court in its trilogy of cases 174 in which it has treated marriage as a
fundamental right, 175 while others contend that the existing fundamental
right to marry refers to opposite-sex marriage, characterize the right at
issue narrowly as “same-sex marriage,” and proceed to apply the Court’s
precedents for determining whether or not to recognize a new
fundamental right. 176
In addition to the lack of consensus regarding how to frame a right for
purposes of fundamental rights analysis, lower courts are not of one
mind on what they are supposed to look to in deciding whether the right
exists. Thus, lower courts split on whether they must find that the right
at issue is deeply rooted in the nation’s history and tradition, 177 or if
contemporary practice is also a relevant consideration.178
174. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 78; Zablocki, 434 U.S. 374; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
175. See Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1209–18 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct.
265 (2014); De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 651, 658–59 (W.D. Tex. 2014); Golinski v.
U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 982 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 2012); In re Marriage Cases,
183 P.3d 384, 420–21, 421 n.33, 429–30 (Cal. 2008).
176. See Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1071, 1094–96 (D. Haw. 2012); In re
Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 674–75 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010); Conaway v. Deane, 932
A.2d 571, 617–24 (Md. 2007); Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 976–99 (Wash. 2006);
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E. 2d 1, 9–10 (N.Y. 2006); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 55–57 (Haw.
1993).
177. See Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1239–44 (11th Cir. 2004).
178. See Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 54 (1st Cir. 2008); Williams, 378 F.3d at 1252–59 (Barkett,
J., dissenting); Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275, 1308–09
(11th Cir. 2004) (Barkett, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
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This split amongst the lower courts follows from a degree of doctrinal
confusion in the Court’s own fundamental rights precedents, and is
important for addressing the constitutionality of laws that either prohibit
or deter people from pursuing surrogacy, as well as laws that prevent
such persons from establishing legal parentage of the children born via
surrogacy.
B.

The Framing and Recognition of Fundamental Rights

Much of the confusion surrounding both the question of framing
rights for purposes of fundamental rights analysis as well as the
appropriate sources to look to in determining whether to recognize such
rights, so framed, can be traced to the Court itself wavering on both of
these issues over the course of the past several decades as shifting
majorities have decided fundamental rights cases. Differences of opinion
regarding these two inquiries almost certainly reflect the Justices’
predisposition in favor or against recognition of unenumerated
fundamental rights. If one’s judicial philosophy is hostile to the
recognition of such rights, insisting on narrowly framing the right at
issue and asking whether the right, so framed, is deeply rooted in history
and tradition will result in only rarely recognizing such rights. In
contrast, if one’s judicial philosophy favors recognition of such rights,
allowing for broad framing of the right at issue and/or consideration of
modern trends in addition to history and tradition, makes recognition of
fundamental rights far more likely.
In general, the Court’s cases prior to its 1986 decision in Bowers v.
Hardwick 179 tended to frame the right at issue in somewhat more general
terms. Thus, for example, when considering in Skinner v. Oklahoma 180 a
challenge to a law providing for the sterilization of convicted criminals,
the Court spoke generally of the right to “procreation.” 181 When the
Court in Griswold v. Connecticut 182 considered the constitutionality of a
state law prohibiting married couples from obtaining contraception, the
Court framed the right at issue as the right to “privacy surrounding the
marriage relationship.” 183 When considering the constitutionality of laws
prohibiting interracial marriage in Loving v. Virginia, 184 marriage by
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

478 U.S. 186 (1986).
316 U.S. 535 (1942).
Id. at 541.
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Id. at 486.
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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those with outstanding child support obligations in Zablocki v.
Redhail, 185 and marriage by prisoners in Turner v. Safley, 186 the Court
framed the right at issue in all of those cases more generally as the right
“to marry,” 187 not more narrowly as the rights to interracial marriage,
deadbeat dad marriage, and prisoner marriage. 188 And when the Court in
Roe v. Wade 189 considered the constitutionality of laws prohibiting or
severely restricting the ability to obtain an abortion, the Court
characterized the fundamental right at issue as a “right of personal
privacy” that was broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. 190
In recognizing the rights at issue in these pre-Bowers cases as
fundamental, the Court stressed the fact that the rights at issue were
deeply rooted in history. Thus, for example, in Griswold, the Court
described the right to marital privacy at issue in the case as “a right of
privacy older than the Bill of Rights.” 191 And in Roe, the Court carefully
examined the history of abortion regulation, and found pertinent that
there had been a long history at common law and in early U.S. history of
only limited regulation of abortion before states started to enact more
restrictive abortion laws, 192 that the Roe Court described as being “of
relatively recent vintage.” 193 Thus, in these various pre-Bowers cases,
history was pertinent because it demonstrated that the laws at issue
curtailed liberties that had a long history of being exercised free of
governmental interference. As Cass Sunstein has explained, in this
regard the substantive aspect of the Due Process Clause has been
interpreted by the Court “to protect traditional practices against short-run
departures . . . brought about by temporary majorities who are
insufficiently sensitive to the claims of history.” 194

185. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
186. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
187. See id. at 95; Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383; Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
188. See Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1209–18 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct.
265 (2014); De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 651, 658–59 (W.D. Tex. 2014); Golinski v.
U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 982 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 2012); In re Marriage Cases,
183 P.3d 384, 420–21 & n.33, 429–30 (Cal. 2008).
189. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
190. Id. at 129, 152–53.
191. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
192. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 113, 132–36, 138–41 (1973).
193. Id. at 129.
194. Sunstein, supra note 166, 1163 (1988); accord Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 377 n.12
(Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (Anderson, J., dissenting) (citing Sunstein, supra note 166, at 1171); Dean v.
D.C., 653 A.2d 307, 342 (D.C. 1993) (Ferren, A.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
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In 1986, the Court in Bowers considered a due process challenge to a
state law that made sodomy a crime—whether consensual or not and
whether between persons of the same or opposite sex—as applied to
consensual sodomy between two persons of the same sex. 195 In Bowers,
the Court rejected a more general framing of the right at issue as a right
to “private sexual conduct between consenting adults,” instead framing
the rights inquiry more specifically as one of whether there was “a
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.” 196 Having
so framed the right, the Court then concluded that it was not deeply
rooted in history but instead that proscriptions against sodomy have
“ancient roots,” noting that it was a criminal offense at common law and
in all of the thirteen colonies, that when the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified all but five states criminalized sodomy, that until 1961 all fifty
states criminalized it, and that at the time of the decision about half of
the states still criminalized sodomy. 197 In a separate concurring opinion,
Chief Justice Burger added to the majority’s historical analysis, writing
that “[d]ecisions of individuals relating to homosexual conduct have
been subject to state intervention throughout the history of Western
civilization.” 198 Specifically, he noted that “[c]ondemnation of those
practices is firmly rooted in Judeao-Christian moral and ethical
standards” and that “[h]omosexual sodomy was a capital crime under
Roman law.” 199
Three years later, the Court, in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 200 considered
a substantive due process challenge to a state law that conclusively
presumes a woman’s husband to be the father of any children born to her
during the marriage, with only a limited time period (two years) for
either the husband or wife—but not third persons—to use blood tests to
challenge the presumption. 201 The challenge to the statute was brought
by a man who had an affair with a married woman and claimed to be the
genetic father to a child she bore.202 While the dissent argued for a more
general framing of the question as “whether parenthood is an interest
(quoting Sunstein, supra note 166, at 1163); Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 718 (1989)
(Norris, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Sunstein, supra note 166, at 1163 (1988)).
195. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 186 n.1, 187–88 (1986).
196. Id. at 190–91.
197. Id. at 192–94.
198. Id. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
199. Id. at 196–97.
200. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
201. See id. at 117–18 (plurality opinion).
202. See id. at 113–16 (plurality opinion).
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that historically has received our attention and protection,” 203 the
plurality penned by Justice Scalia framed it more narrowly as “the power
of the natural father to assert parental rights over a child born into a
woman’s existing marriage with another man,” 204 or alternatively, “the
rights of the natural father of a child adulterously conceived.” 205 On the
issue of framing for substantive due process claims, the plurality more
generally wrote that “[w]e refer to the most specific level at which a
relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right
can be identified.” 206 With respect to the appropriate source to look to in
determining whether such a right existed, the plurality cited both Roe
and Bowers for the proposition that “historical traditions” were the
appropriate focal point. 207 Noting that the law at issue—the presumption
of legitimacy and the fact that it could not be challenged by anyone other
than the husband or wife (and in many cases, not even by them)—was a
fundamental principle of common law and the law of most states for
much of U.S. history, akin to the sodomy laws at issue in Bowers and in
stark contrast to the absence of such a longstanding history for restrictive
abortion laws of the sort at issue in Roe, the plurality rejected the natural
father’s substantive due process claim. 208
In Michael H., however, only four Justices agreed that the framing of
rights for purposes of fundamental rights analysis must always be at a
very specific level. On this point, Justices O’Connor and Kennedy wrote
separately to note that this approach “may be somewhat inconsistent
with our past decisions in this area,” and, citing the Court’s decisions in
Griswold, Loving, and Turner, wrote that “[o]n occasion the Court has
characterized relevant traditions protecting asserted rights at levels of
generality that might not be ‘the most specific level’ available.”209 Three
years later, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey 210—in a decision reaffirming the right of a woman to decide
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy—these two moderate Justices
in their “joint opinion” with Justice Souter, once again rejected the idea
that fundamental rights should always be framed “at the most specific

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at 139 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 125 (plurality opinion).
See id. at 127 n.6.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 124–27, 126 n.6.
Id. at 132 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part).
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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level” possible. 211 They wrote that “such a view would be inconsistent
with our law,” noting that “interracial marriage” was illegal in most
States for much of U.S. history but the Court nonetheless concluded that
laws prohibiting it violated the substantive component of the due process
clause. 212 Indeed, at one point the joint opinion used breathtakingly
general language to describe the rights substantively protected by the
Due Process Clause, writing that “[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to
define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and
of the mystery of human life.” 213
While the Court in Casey, just like the Court in Michael H., was
unable to get a majority of Justices to agree upon a methodology for
framing and identifying fundamental rights, five years later, in
Washington v. Glucksberg, 214 an opinion for the Court finally set forth
such a methodology. At issue in the case was whether a law making it a
crime to assist someone in committing suicide ran afoul of a
fundamental right guaranteed by the substantive component of the Due
Process Clause. 215
In Glucksberg, the Court held that identifying fundamental rights
requires a two-part inquiry: First, the court must articulate a “careful
description” of the right at stake and second, it must ask whether the
right, so described, is “objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition,’ and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’
such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were
sacrificed.’” 216 With respect to the “careful description” prong, the Court
appeared to equate “careful” with precise or narrow, holding that the
right at issue was not properly framed more generally as the “right to
die” or the right to “control of one’s final days,” but more specifically as
“a right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in
doing so.” 217 Having so narrowly and specifically framed the right, the
Court canvassed the historical record and, having found that assisting
suicide was criminalized at common law, in the colonies, and most of
the states at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, concluded
that the right was thus not deeply rooted in history and tradition, and,
accordingly, that it was not a fundamental right protected by the Due
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id. at 847–48 (joint opinion).
Id.
Id. at 851.
521 U.S. 702 (1997).
Id. at 705–07.
Id. at 720–21.
Id. at 722–24.
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Process Clause. 218 Thus, Glucksberg seemed to resolve the debate over
framing and recognizing fundamental rights in favor of rather narrow
framing and a focus on deep-rooted history and tradition.
However, the continued vitality of the Glucksberg methodology has
been uncertain since the Court issued its 2003 opinion in Lawrence v.
Texas, 219 in which the Court overruled its earlier decision in Bowers and
declared that laws criminalizing sodomy violate the substantive
component of the due process clause. In overruling Bowers, the
Lawrence Court criticized several aspects of the methodology framed in
that case. First, with respect to framing the right at issue, the Lawrence
Court held that Bowers framed the right at issue too narrowly—as the
right to engage in homosexual sodomy—and suggested instead that it
should be more broadly framed as the right to engage in sexual activity
in private within the confines of a personal relationship.220 Next, the
Court made two important methodological points with respect to the
Bowers Court’s historical analysis. First, in considering the historical
record, the Lawrence Court, while acknowledging the long-standing
presence of laws criminalizing sodomy, noted that there was a history of
nonenforcement of such laws against consenting adults acting in private,
and that this nonenforcement—despite facial applicability—was
tantamount to a history of non-interference with the right at issue.221
Second, the Court noted that these early laws were targeted at sodomy
generally, not specifically toward homosexual sodomy, and that it was
not until the last third of the twentieth century that legislatures began to
enact laws specifically targeting homosexual sodomy, 222 thus echoing
Roe’s focus on the laws at issue being of “relatively recent vintage.” 223
Third, in contrast to Chief Justice Burger’s focus on early history, the
Lawrence Court noted that “our laws and traditions in the past half
century are of most relevance here,” which the Court described as

218. See id. at 710–16, 723, 728. The Glucksberg Court acknowledged Casey’s broad statement
that “[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life,” but held that this statement was simply a general
description of those rights that the Court had found in the past to be protected by the due process
clause, and not a prescriptive test for identifying such rights. Id. at 726–27 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S.
at 851).
219. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
220. See id. at 566–67. In addition, the Court also cited Casey’s broad statement that “[a]t the
heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe,
and of the mystery of human life.” Id. at 574 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
221. See id. at 569–70, 572–73.
222. See id. at 570.
223. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973).
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showing “an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection
to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters
pertaining to sex” that “should have been apparent when Bowers was
decided.” 224 The Court then proceeded to consider a variety of more
contemporary developments extant at the time Bowers was decided that
demonstrated this “emerging awareness,” including (1) the 1955 Model
Penal Code’s recommendation that there be no criminal penalties for
sexual relations conducted in private; (2) that soon thereafter, Illinois
and other states repealed their criminal penalties for consensual sodomy;
(3) that states with sodomy laws on the books were not enforcing them;
and (4) that sodomy laws were repealed in the United Kingdom and that
the European Court of Human Rights declared such laws to violate the
European Convention on Human Rights. 225 The Lawrence Court thus
concluded that “[h]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all
cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.” 226
Lawrence thus seemed, in effect, to overrule or at least modify
Glucksberg in that it both indicated that the framing should not be
unduly narrow and that it did not require an exclusive focus on deeprooted history and tradition. But this conclusion is not universally
accepted, in large part because lower courts are split on the question
whether Lawrence is even a fundamental rights case. 227 This is because
Lawrence, while criticizing Bowers, never explicitly articulated that it
was recognizing a fundamental right and did not explicitly state that it
was applying strict or some other form of heightened scrutiny, and
instead merely concluded that the law at issue furthers “no legitimate
state interest,” the language of rational basis review.228 Indeed, in his
dissent in Lawrence, Justice Scalia characterized the majority’s decision
as merely overturning Bowers’ holding that sodomy laws are justified by
a legitimate governmental interest, and that the majority left intact the
Bowers Court’s holding that it was not a fundamental right, and thus,
presumably, the methodology it employed for framing and recognizing
224. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571–72.
225. See id. at 572–73.
226. Id. at 572 (citation omitted).
227. Compare Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1236–38 (11th Cir. 2004) (not a
fundamental rights case), and Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804,
815–17 (11th Cir. 2004) (same), with Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 817–18 (9th Cir.
2008) (treating it as a not-quite-fundamental right subject to intermediate scrutiny), Cook v. Gates,
528 F.3d 42, 55 (1st Cir. 2008) (same), Williams, 378 F.3d at 1252–56 (Barkett, J., dissenting)
(fundamental rights case), and Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 377 F.3d
1275, 1304–07 (11th Cir. 2004) (Barkett, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
228. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578; see also id. at 586, 594 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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fundamental rights. 229
Some lower court judges, in line with Justice Scalia’s dissent, note
that Lawrence never engaged in the Glucksberg two-step analysis, did
not explicitly say it was overruling Glucksberg, and did not explicitly
state that it was recognizing a fundamental right or applying strict
scrutiny. 230 They thus treat Lawrence as merely a case holding that the
law at issue did not pass rational basis review under the Due Process
Clause, and continue to apply Glucksberg’s methodology. 231
Accordingly, in addition to requiring that the right at issue be narrowly
framed, 232 these courts reject an examination of contemporary trends
when conducting fundamental rights analyses. 233
Yet other lower court judges—noting that the Lawrence Court clearly
placed its decision within its due process fundamental rights line of
cases and required the government to justify the law, a hallmark of
heightened rather than rational basis review—conclude that Lawrence
was either a fundamental rights case applying strict scrutiny 234 or
something akin to a semi-fundamental rights case applying something
like intermediate scrutiny. 235 These judges thus conclude that Lawrence,
coming after Glucksberg, must be viewed as clarifying or modifying
both aspects of the Glucksberg analysis. First, with respect to the level at
which rights must be framed, these judges conclude that Glucksberg’s
“careful description” 236 requirement is not synonymous with framing the
liberty interest in the narrowest fashion possible. 237 And second, with
229. See id. at 586, 594 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
230. See Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 538 F.3d 355, 360–62 (5th Cir. 2008) (Garza, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Witt, 548 F.3d at 1273–75 (O’Scannlain, J.,
dissenting); Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City, 528 F.3d 762, 769–72 (10th Cir. 2008); Muth v. Frank,
412 F.3d 808, 817–18 (7th Cir. 2005); Williams, 378 F.3d at 1234–38; Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of
Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 815–17 (11th Cir. 2004).
231. See Reliable Consultants, Inc., 538 F.3d at 360–62 (Jones, C.J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc); Witt, 548 F.3d at 1273–75 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting); Seegmiller, 528 F.3d at
769–72; Muth, 412 F.3d at 817–18; Williams, 378 F.3d at 1234–38; Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of
Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, at 815–17 (11th Cir. 2004).
232. See Witt, 548 F.3d at 1273–75 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting); Williams, 378 F.3d at 1239–50;
Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, at 816–17 (11th Cir. 2004).
233. See Williams, 378 F.3d at 1239–44.
234. See id. at 1252–59 (Barkett, J., dissenting); Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children and Family
Services, 377 F.3d 1275, 1308–09 (11th Cir. 2004) (Barkett, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc).
235. See Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 51–56 (1st Cir. 2008); Witt, 527 F.3d at 817–19.
236. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (citations omitted).
237. See Cook, 528 F.3d at 54; Williams, 378 F.3d at 1252–59 (Barkett, J., dissenting); Lofton v.
Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275, 1308–09 (11th Cir. 2004) (Barkett, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
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respect to the role of history and tradition, these courts hold that they
provide a starting point but not always the ending point, with
contemporary trends and practices also being a valid consideration. 238
With the impact that Lawrence had on Glucksberg thus unsettled, in
the pages that follow I will address the fundamental rights claims
following both the Glucksberg methodology as well as any potential
modifications that Lawrence has made to that methodology.
C.

The Fundamental Right to Enter into Surrogacy Arrangements

One of the most long-standing fundamental rights recognized by the
U.S. Supreme Court is the right to procreate, which was first recognized
by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1942 in Skinner v. Oklahoma. 239 At issue
in Skinner was a state law that provided for the sterilization of those
convicted three times of certain crimes but not those convicted of other
crimes. 240 The Court described the right at issue as “a right which is
basic to the perpetuation of a race—the right to have offspring.” 241 The
Court treated the problem as one of equal protection, and held that where
what are involved are rights fundamental to the human race—which it
denominated as “[m]arriage and procreation”—strict scrutiny was
applicable. 242 In explaining the importance of strict scrutiny in the
procreation context, the Court reasoned not only that “[t]he power to
sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and devastating
effects” but that “[i]n evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types
which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear.” 243
Although in Skinner, the Court invoked the Equal Protection Clause,
subsequent cases have characterized the right at issue there as protected
by the substantive component of the Due Process Clause. 244 Moreover,
Skinner and the right to procreation recognized therein have served as
the building block of many other subsequently recognized fundamental
rights. Thus, for example, Loving relied on Skinner’s dicta regarding
238. See Cook, 528 F.3d at 54; Williams, 378 F.3d at 1252–59 (Barkett, J., dissenting); Lofton v.
Sec’y of Dep’t of Children and Family Services, 377 F.3d 1275, 1308–09 (11th Cir. 2004) (Barkett,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
239. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
240. Id. at 536–37.
241. Id. at 536.
242. Id. at 541.
243. Id.
244. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573–74 (2003); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846–51 (1992) (joint opinion); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678,
684–85 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973).
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“[m]arriage and procreation” 245 for its conclusion that marriage was a
fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause. 246 And the
Court’s cases regarding contraception and abortion—all of which
involve the right not to procreate—are derivative of and rely upon the
right to procreate recognized in Skinner. 247
So strong is the right to procreate recognized in Skinner and so
stringent is the strict scrutiny associated with infringements on that right
that lower courts have felt compelled to strike down laws even in
circumstances in which the government’s rationale for restricting that
right seems reasonable. Thus, courts have struck down probation
conditions that prevent those convicted of nonsupport of existing
children 248 or possession of child pornography from fathering
children, 249 or probation conditions that prohibit a woman from getting
pregnant who has been convicted of drug use and possession, 250 child
endangerment, 251 or child neglect resulting in death. 252
Since surrogacy arrangements are nearly always pursued by couples
who are otherwise unable to procreate without the assistance of third
parties, 253 the most certain way to have laws declared unconstitutional
that make it a crime to enter into surrogacy arrangements, or that
otherwise seek to deter them, is to frame the right at issue as the right to
procreate and to apply the strict scrutiny associated with infringements
upon that right.
Yet the same rights-framing quandary that courts are grappling with
in cases challenging the constitutionality of laws prohibiting same-sex
marriage is present in cases challenging laws prohibiting surrogacy.
245. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (emphasis added).
246. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
247. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152–53; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453–54 (1972); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965); id. at 502–03 (White, J., concurring); id. at 496–97
(Goldberg, J., concurring) (reasoning that if it were constitutional to criminalize the use of
contraception, it would likewise be constitutional for the government to forcibly sterilize people
who have had two children).
248. See State v. Talty, 814 N.E.2d 1201, 1203–07 (Ohio 2004).
249. See United States v. Scalise, 398 F. App’x 736, 742 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Loy,
237 F.3d 251, 269 (3d Cir. 2001).
250. See People v. Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
251. See People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 364–66 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
252. See Trammel v. State, 751 N.E.2d 283, 288–91 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
253. The one exception is so-called “social surrogacy,” in which a woman otherwise able
medically to become pregnant and give birth hires a surrogate to avoid either ruining her figure or
impacting her career. See Sarah Elizabeth Richards, Should a Woman Be Allowed to Hire a
Surrogate Because She Fears Pregnancy Will Hurt Her Career?, ELLE (Apr. 17, 2014),
http://www.elle.com/life-love/society-career/birth-rights.
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Thus, while some courts have characterized laws that restrict surrogacy
as falling within the established fundamental right to procreate, 254 others
declare that this pre-existing right is about natural procreation, and that
what is at issue is a newly claimed fundamental right to procreate with
the assistance of technology and third parties.255 Moreover, where only
one of the intended parents seeks to use their genetic material in the
process—such as in a traditional surrogacy scenario or where third-party
donor eggs or sperm will be used—courts have held that only the
procreative rights of that intended parent are at stake since the other
intended parent is not, strictly speaking, procreating. 256
If Lawrence—through its criticism of Bowers for narrowly describing
the right at issue as the right to engage in homosexual sodomy instead of
more broadly as the right to engage in sexual activity in private within
the confines of a personal relationship 257—has modified Glucksberg’s
“careful description” requirement, 258 it would follow that in cases
challenging laws that criminalize or otherwise restrict access to
surrogacy, framing the right at issue as the right to procreate would be
the appropriate level of generality. From the standpoint of a couple
whose only hope of procreating is through the assistance of a surrogate,
a law that criminalizes that assistance is no different than the law
providing for the sterilization of convicted felons in Skinner: in both
instances, the government’s action prevents the target’s ability to
procreate. Thus, laws criminalizing or otherwise restricting surrogacy
should be deemed constitutional only if they satisfy strict scrutiny.
As explained above, however, some courts conclude that Lawrence
was not a fundamental rights case, and that Glucksberg’s more
conservative approach to framing still governs. 259 Recall that in
Glucksberg, the Court framed the right at issue in that case as the right to

254. See J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1277–78 (D. Utah 2002); Belsito v. Clark, 644
N.E.2d 760, 766 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1994); Doe v. Attorney Gen., 487 N.W.2d 484, 486 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1992).
255. See Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1095 n.20 (D. Haw. 2012); T.M.H. v.
D.M.T., 79 So. 3d 787, 818–19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (Lawson, J., dissenting).
256. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1253–54 (N.J. 1988).
257. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 566–67 (2003).
258. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (citations omitted).
259. See Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 538 F.3d 355, 360–62 (5th Cir. 2008) (Garza, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 548 F.3d 1264, 1273–
75 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting); Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City, 528 F.3d
762, 769–72 (10th Cir. 2008); Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 817–18 (7th Cir. 2005); Williams v.
Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1234–38 (11th Cir. 2004); Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of
Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 815–17 (11th Cir. 2004).
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commit suicide “which itself includes a right to assistance in doing
so,” 260 and then examined the extent to which law historically
criminalized assisting suicide even when it left the act of committing or
attempting to commit suicide alone unregulated. 261 Applying
Glucksberg’s methodology to a case involving a law restricting
surrogacy, a court might frame the right at issue more narrowly as a right
to procreate which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so, and
examine the extent to which there is a deep-rooted right to procure the
assistance of a third person for the purpose of procreating. 262 It would
seem, however, that under Glucksberg, at least for framing purposes, 263
one would not need to separately frame a right to procreate via
traditional surrogacy and a right to procreate via gestational surrogacy.
After all, even Glucksberg, while narrowly framing the issue, did not
contend that for framing purposes it was necessary to distinguish, say,
between assisted suicide by means of a gun versus by poison.
Yet even if Glucksberg’s more conservative approach to framing still
controls where fundamental rights are involved, I believe that the right to
surrogacy would itself be found to be an independent fundamental right,
and thus that the same heightened scrutiny applied to infringements upon
other fundamental rights would follow. This is because the right to
procure the assistance of a surrogate has an unparalleled history of being
exercised free from governmental interference.
1.

The History of Surrogacy

Laws criminalizing or even regulating surrogacy, either in the United
States or elsewhere, are both rare and—to quote Roe—“are of relatively
recent vintage.” 264 The practice of surrogacy itself, although sometimes
thought of as a relatively new phenomenon brought about by the advent
of medical science, has been around in some form for much of recorded
history.
Indeed, surrogacy first appears in the Bible, where the book of
Genesis recounts at least two instances of it. The first instance is the
story of Sarah—the wife of Abraham—who was unable to bear
260. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722–24 (emphasis added).
261. See id. at 711–19.
262. Cf. id. at 723 (framing the due process issue as the right at issue in that case as the right to
commit suicide “which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so”).
263. There might be different compelling governmental interests where traditional surrogacy is
involved, however, that might justify restricting or prohibiting it under strict scrutiny analysis while
leaving gestational surrogacy unregulated. These interests are discussed below.
264. 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973).
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children. 265 They resolved their infertility problem by enlisting Sarah’s
servant, Hagar, to serve as what would today be the equivalent of a
traditional surrogate. 266 Similarly, when Jacob’s two wives, Rachel and
Leah, were unable to bear children, their servants likewise served as
traditional surrogates. 267
For most of the period between Biblical times and the present,
surrogacy was treated as an unregulated private matter that was neither
expressly permitted nor expressly prohibited by the law. It was only in
the early 1980s that governments began to even consider regulating
surrogacy. The first governments to do so—the United Kingdom 268 and
Victoria, Australia 269—established committees in 1982 to study the issue
as a reaction to the first “test tube babies” being born in those two
countries. 270 In 1984, those committees both recommended the

265. Genesis 16:1.
266. Genesis 16:1–16. At the time these Biblical events took place, artificial insemination—the
procedure used for impregnating modern-day traditional surrogates—had not yet developed, and so
these early instances of surrogacy involved the intended father engaging in an act of sexual
intercourse with the surrogate. See Doe v. Doe, 710 A.2d 1297, 1306 (Conn. 1997). While this
would at first blush seem to violate Biblical proscriptions against adultery, the Biblical definition of
adultery did not encompass sexual activity between a married man and an unmarried woman. See
Peter Nicolas, The Lavender Letter: Applying the Law of Adultery to Same-Sex Couples and SameSex Conduct, 63 FLA. L. REV. 97, 105–06 (2011); Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Gestation: Work for Hire
or the Essence of Motherhood? A Comparative Legal Analysis, 9 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 91,
120 (2002). These Biblical surrogates also differ from modern-day surrogates in that the former
were indentured servants and thus not free to refuse their masters’ request that they serve as
surrogates, while the latter are free to choose whether or not to serve as surrogates to intended
parents.
267. See Genesis 30:1–10. In recent debates over a bill to criminalize surrogacy in Kansas,
opponents of the bill contended that it would have the effect of criminalizing the Immaculate
Conception, characterizing the Angel Gabriel as, in effect, a surrogacy broker between God and the
Virgin Mary. See Bryan Lowry, Kansas Lawmakers Hear Testimony on Bill Making Surrogacy
Contracts Illegal, THE WICHITA EAGLE (Jan. 27, 2014), http://eprod.kansas.com/news/politicsgovernment/article1132756.html (last visited June 11, 2014); Luke 1:26–38, 2:1–40. However, the
story of the Immaculate Conception, whereby Mary and Joseph raised Jesus perhaps suggests that
Mary was not a surrogate in the sense we think of the term today, but rather that God was the
equivalent of a “sperm donor.”
268. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & SOCIAL SECURITY, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO
HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY, 1984, PARL. cmnd. 9314, at iv, 4 (U.K.) [hereinafter
THE WARNOCK REPORT], available at http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/Warnock_Report_of_the_
Committee_of_Inquiry_into_Human_Fertilisation_and_Embryology_1984.pdf (last visited Nov. 8,
2014).
269. See Explanatory Memorandum, Current Issues Brief No. 5: Assisted Reproductive
Treatment Bill 2008 (Vict.) 16 (Austl.).
270. See THE WARNOCK REPORT, supra note 268, at iv, 4; History of Assisted Reproductive
Treatment in Victoria, VICTORIAN ASSISTED REPROD. TREATMENT AUTHORITY,
http://www.varta.org.au/history-of-art-in-victoria/ (last visited July 16, 2014).
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enactment of laws prohibiting surrogacy. 271 That same year, the
Victorian Parliament assented to a comprehensive law regulating
assisted reproduction, including surrogacy, declaring surrogacy
contracts—whether or not entered into for compensation—to be
unenforceable and imposing criminal penalties for those entering into
such arrangements, 272 but the portions of the law dealing with surrogacy
did not take effect at that time. 273
Around this same time, three highly visible instances of surrogacy
were taking place in England, Australia, and the United States that
served as catalysts for laws restricting or regulating surrogacy. In 1985,
in Baby Cotton, 274 a court in England resolved a custody issue in a case
involving compensated traditional surrogacy. There was no dispute
between the surrogate and the intended parents regarding custody, but a
local social services agency intervened and sought to prevent the
couple—who was from the United States—from taking custody of the
child and taking her out of England. 275 The judge ruled that the
arrangement was proper and that the couple could take the child out of
England, and public outrage over the case resulted in the enactment of
the Surrogacy Arrangements Act of 1985, 276 which made it a criminal
offense for third parties—such as surrogacy agencies—to take part in
commercial surrogacy. The law, however, did not make it an offense for
the surrogate or intended parents to enter into such arrangements.
That same year, one U.S. state, Arkansas, became the first state in the
country to enact any legislation on the issue of surrogacy, 277 but the
statute was designed to facilitate rather than restrict surrogacy. It
declared that in the case of an unmarried surrogate impregnated using
artificial insemination, the intended mother—not the surrogate—is
presumed to be the legal mother of the child 278 (the statute was
subsequently expanded to include the same presumption in situations in
which the surrogate is married). 279 The following year, Victoria,
271. See THE WARNOCK REPORT, supra note 268, at ¶¶ 8.18–8.19; Explanatory Memorandum,
supra note 269, at 20.
272. See Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act 1984 (Vict.) paras 11, 12, 13, 30 (Austl.).
273. See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 269, at 20.
274. See Diana Brahams, The Hasty British Ban on Commercial Surrogacy, 17 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 16, 16–17 (1987) (discussing Baby Cotton case).
275. See id. at 16.
276. Surrogacy Arrangements Act of 1985, c. 49 (U.K.).
277. See Joanna K. Budde, Comment, Surrogate Parenting: Future Legislation to Eliminate
Present Inconsistencies, 26 DUQ. L. REV. 633, 653 (1988).
278. See Act of Apr. 15, 1985, No. 904, §§ 1–2, 1985 Ark. Acts 1931, 1932.
279. See Act of Mar. 17, 1989, No. 647, § 1, 1989 Ark. Acts 1505, 1506–07 (codified at ARK.
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Australia put portions of its laws regulating surrogacy into effect, 280 but
it was not until 1988—following a high-profile instance of surrogacy in
Australia which one sister served as the surrogate for the other—that the
full force of the 1984 law was put into effect. 281
In the United States, the spark for implementing restrictive surrogacy
legislation was the Baby M 282 case in New Jersey. Like Baby Cotton,
Baby M involved compensated traditional surrogacy, but unlike in Baby
Cotton, the surrogate in Baby M had a change of heart and sought
custody of the child shortly after giving birth in 1986. 283 In 1987, a New
Jersey trial court held the surrogacy contract enforceable, awarded
custody to the intended father—who was also the genetic father—
terminated the surrogate’s parental rights, and granted the intended
mother’s petition to adopt the child. 284 But in 1988, New Jersey’s
Supreme Court reversed the decision, declaring the surrogacy contract to
be unenforceable as contrary to public policy, and declaring the intended
father and the surrogate to be the legal parents of the child. 285 It refused
to terminate the surrogate’s parental rights, although it awarded custody
to the intended father and visitation to the surrogate. 286
Like the issue of same-sex marriage in the last decade, the Baby M
case was highly publicized. 287 Both while it was winding its way
through the New Jersey courts and in its aftermath, several state
legislatures stepped in and enacted laws prohibiting surrogacy, or at least
making surrogacy contracts unenforceable. Louisiana became the first
state in the nation to do so, 288 enacting in 1987 a law declaring surrogacy
CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Extraordinary Sess.)).
280. See Proclamation, Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act 1984, 67 VICT. GOV’T GAZETTE
3011, 3011–12 (Aug. 6, 1986).
281. See Proclamation of Commencement, Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act 1984, G16 VICT.
GOV’T GAZETTE 1053, 1123 (May 4, 1988); Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 269, at 20–21.
282. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
283. Id. at 1236–37.
284. See id. at 1237–38; In re Baby M, 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987).
285. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227.
286. See id. When Baby M herself reached the age of majority, she successfully moved to have
the surrogate’s parental rights terminated and the intended mother’s adoption petition approved. See
Jennifer Weiss, Now It’s Melissa’s Time, NEW JERSEY MONTHLY MAG. (Mar. 2007),
http://web.archive.org/web/20070526004403/http://www.njmonthly.com/issues/2007/03Mar/babym.htm.
287. See, e.g., Barbara Kantrowitz et al., Who Keeps ‘Baby M’?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 19, 1987, at
44; Mary Shaughnessy, All For Love of a Baby, PEOPLE, Mar. 23, 1987, at 50.
288. See Linda S. Anderson, Legislative Oppression: Restricting Gestational Surrogacy to
Married Couples Is an Attempt to Legislate Morality, 42 U. BALT. L. REV. 611, 623 n.64 (2013);
Robert D. Arenstein, Is Surrogacy Against Public Policy? The Answer Is Yes, 18 SETON HALL L.
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contracts unenforceable, but not imposing any civil or criminal penalties
for entering into such contracts. 289 It was quickly followed in 1988 and
1989 by several other state laws declaring surrogacy contracts to be
unenforceable, 290 including Nebraska 291 Indiana, 292 North Dakota, 293 and
Arizona. 294
In the wake of Baby M, several other states went further, not merely
declaring such contracts unenforceable but imposing criminal penalties
on those who entered into and/or those who helped to facilitate
surrogacy agreements. The year Baby M was decided, Florida 295 and
Michigan 296 enacted statutes criminalizing both entering into and serving
as an intermediary for surrogacy agreements in terms that were broad
enough to encompass traditional as well as gestational surrogacy, while
that same year Kentucky enacted a similar law that only encompassed
traditional surrogacy. 297 In 1989, Utah 298 and Washington State 299
REV. 831, 832 (1988); Robert L. Geltzer et al., National Conference on Birth, Death, and Law, 29
JURIMETRICS J. 403, 416 n.49 (1989).
289. See Act of July 9, 1987, No. 583, 1987 La. Acts 1433 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:2713 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.)).
290. In tracing this early history, I am indebted to the then-contemporary research found in
MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: THE LEGAL AND HUMAN ISSUES 157–69 (expanded
ed. 1990) and in Arenstein, supra note 288, at 832.
291. See Act of Feb. 10, 1988, No. 674, § 1, 1988 Neb. Laws 572 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 25-21,200 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.)).
292. See Act of Mar. 5, 1988, No. 175, 1988 Ind. Acts 2050; Act of July 1, 1997, No. 1, 1997 Ind.
Acts 255 (codified at IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-20-1-1 to 31-20-1-2 (West, Westlaw through 2d Reg.
Sess. & 2d Technical Sess. 2014)).
293. See Assisted Conception Act, ch. 184, § 5, 1989 N.D. Laws 561, 562 (codified at N.D.
CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-18-05 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.)).
294. See Act of Apr. 28, 1989, ch.114, 1989 Ariz. Sess. Laws 393 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 25-218 (Westlaw through 2d Reg. & Special Sess. 2014)).
295. See Act of July 1, 1988, ch. 88-143, 1988 Fla. Laws 749 (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 63.212(1)(i), (6) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sp. “A” Sess.)). The penalty for violating the
statute is up to five years in prison. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.082(3)(d) (West, Westlaw through
2014 Sp. “A” Sess.).
296. See Act of June 27, 1988, No. 199, 1988 Mich. Pub. Acts 493 (codified at MICH. COMP.
LAW ANN. § 722.859 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess. Act 282)). The penalty for violating
the statute was up to one year in prison and a $10,000 fine for the contracting parties and up to five
years in prison and a $50,000 fine for third parties helping to arrange such agreements. See id.
297. See Act of Mar. 11, 1988, ch. 52, § 1, 1988 Ky. Acts 193, 193–94 (codified at KY. REV. ST.
ANN. § 199.590 (West, Westlaw through 2014 legislation)). The penalty for violating the statute is
up to $2,000 and six months in prison, and provides that “[e]ach day such violation continues shall
constitute a separate offense.” See KY. REV. ST. ANN. § 199.990(2) (West, Westlaw through 2014
legislation). The Kentucky law was preceded by a case holding that traditional surrogacy
arrangements do not violate state law prohibiting the sale of children. See Surrogate Parenting
Associates, Inc. v. Com. ex rel. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986).
298. See Prohibition of Surrogate Parenthood Contracts, ch. 140, § 1, 1989 Utah Laws 333, 333
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enacted statutes criminalizing both entering into and serving as an
intermediary for surrogacy agreements in terms that were broad enough
to encompass traditional as well as gestational surrogacy. In 1990, New
Hampshire enacted a law facilitating surrogacy, but it included a
provision imposing criminal penalties on intermediaries who earned a
fee for facilitating surrogacy agreements. 300 In 1992, New York enacted
a law imposing a civil penalty on those entering into compensated
surrogacy contracts of either sort and imposing civil and criminal
penalties on intermediaries. 301 In 1993, Washington, D.C. enacted a
statute that imposed criminal penalties on those entering into or
facilitating surrogacy agreements of any sort: traditional or gestational,
compensated or uncompensated. 302
Around this same period, the federal government briefly flirted with
the possibility of prohibiting surrogacy on a nationwide basis. Between
1987 and 1989, a series of bills were introduced that would impose
federal criminal penalties for those entering into and/or those brokering
surrogacy agreements, but none progressed in Congress. 303 No bills on
(codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.)). Violations of
the statute were classified as a Class A misdemeanor. See id. The legislation had a sunset provision
of July 1, 1991 to allow a legislative committee to study the issue further, but the sunset provision
was repealed before it could kick in. See Removal of Sunset Date from Surrogate Parenthood Law,
ch. 116, § 1, 1991 Utah Laws 413, 413 (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204).
299. See Act of May 13, 1989, ch. 404, 1989 Wash. Sess. Laws 2178 (codified at WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 26.26.230–26.26.250 (2012)). Violations of the statute are treated as a gross misdemeanor
punishable by up to 364 days in prison and a fine of up to $5,000. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.92.020
(2012). The legislative history of the Washington law makes clear that it was a reaction to the Baby
M case. See Substitute S.B. 5071, 51st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1989), reprinted in FINAL
LEGISLATIVE REPORT, 51ST WASHINGTON STATE LEGISLATURE, 1989 REGULAR, FIRST AND
SECOND SPECIAL SESSIONS 183 (1989); Jim Simon, Surrogate-Motherhood Ban Packs Hearing in
Senate, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 20, 1989, at E1.
300. See Act of Apr. 10, 1990, ch. 87, 1990 N.H. Laws 117 (codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 168-B:16, 168-B:30 (1990)).
301. See Act of July 17, 1992, ch. 308, 1992 N.Y. Laws 2943 (codified at N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 123 (McKinney, Westlaw through 2014 legislation)). The statute imposed a $500 civil penalty on
those entering into surrogacy agreements, a $10,000 civil penalty for the first conviction of a third
party facilitating such agreements, and criminal punishment for subsequent convictions of third
party facilitators. See id. The New York statute was preceded by a handful of court decisions
holding that traditional surrogacy agreements run afoul of law prohibiting the sale of children. See
Anonymous v. Anonymous, No. P–8572/91, 1991 WL 228555 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Oct. 1, 1991); In re
Adoption of Paul, 550 N.Y.S.2d 815 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1990). But see In re Adoption of Baby Girl
L.J., 505 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1986).
302. See Surrogate Parenting Contracts Act of 1992, 40 D.C. Reg. 582 (Jan. 4, 1993) (codified at
D.C. CODE §§ 16-401 to 16-402 (West, Westlaw through Sept. 1, 2014)). Violations of the statute
are punishable by up to one year in prison and a $10,000 fine. See id.
303. See Commercialized Childbearing Act of 1989, H.R. 1188, 101st Cong. (1989); AntiSurrogate Mother Act of 1989, H.R. 576, 101st Cong. (1989); Surrogacy Arrangements Act of
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the issue have been introduced in Congress since 1989.
Following this spurt of legislative activity in the years immediately
following Baby M, states stopped enacting laws criminalizing surrogacy
and instead began enacting laws designed to facilitate surrogacy
arrangements, the details of which were discussed in Part I of this
Article. Since 1993, only one state has enacted a law prohibiting or
criminalizing any aspect of surrogacy. In 2010, Virginia enacted a law
that, while generally facilitating surrogacy arrangements, imposed
criminal penalties on intermediaries who earn a fee for facilitating
Florida
effectively
decriminalized
surrogacy
agreements. 304
305
and 2003 306
compensated surrogacy by enacting laws in 1993
providing for gestational and traditional surrogates, respectively, to be
compensated for “living expenses,” with that term being generously
construed. 307 In 2005, Utah repealed its criminal penalties for surrogacy
and replaced them with a statutory scheme to facilitate surrogacy
arrangements. 308 In 2014, New Hampshire repealed its law imposing
criminal penalties on intermediaries who earned a fee for facilitating
surrogacy agreements. 309 In the last several years, serious efforts to
repeal the prohibitory laws in New York, 310 Washington State, 311 and
Washington, D.C. 312 have been mounted, while laws introduced in
Kansas 313 and Louisiana 314 that would have criminalized surrogacy
1989, H.R. 275, 101st Cong. (1989); Anti-Surrogate Mother Act of 1987, H.R. 3264, 100th Cong.
(1987); Surrogacy Arrangements Act of 1987, H.R. 2433, 100th Cong. (1987). See generally FIELD,
supra note 290, at 155–56.
304. See Act of Apr. 13, 2010, ch. 712, 2010 Va. Acts 1291 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 20165 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess. & 2014 Special Sess.)). In addition, while not
involving the enactment of new laws by state legislatures, Attorneys General in Maryland and
Oklahoma opined that compensated traditional surrogacy agreements violate state laws prohibiting
the sale of children. See 85 Md. Op. Att’y Gen. 348 (2000); 83 Okla. Op. Att’y Gen. 162 (1983).
305. See Act of May 15, 1993, ch. 93-237, 1993 Fla. Laws 2405 (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 742.15 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sp. “A” Sess.)).
306. See Act of May 30, 2003, ch. 2003-58, 2003 Fla. Laws 520 (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 63.213 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sp. “A” Sess.)).
307. See, e.g., Intended Parents & Parents Via Surrogacy: IP in Florida—”No Compensation”?,
supra note 41 (Florida surrogates in online discussion board describing reasonable living expenses
as including rent or mortgage payments, utility bills, and the like); Gestational Surrogacy Price List
(2014), supra note 41 (Florida surrogacy agency website quantifying reasonable living expenses as
ranging between $10,000 and $30,000).
308. See Uniform Parentage Act, ch. 150, § 100, 2005 Utah Laws 1014, 1034.
309. See Act of July 21, 2014, ch. 248, 2014 N.H. Laws C. 248 (S.B. 353).
310. See S. 4617, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013).
311. See H.R. 1267, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011).
312. See Legis. B. 20-32 (D.C. 2013).
313. See S. 302, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2014); Amy Hawley, Lawmakers Decide on
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under some or all circumstances failed to become law.
Taking all of these developments into account, today only three U.S.
jurisdictions—Michigan, Washington, and Washington, D.C.—impose
criminal penalties on those entering into compensated gestational as well
as traditional surrogacy arrangements. Three other states, Kentucky, by
an explicit statute, and Maryland and Oklahoma, by Attorney General
interpretation, impose criminal penalties only on those entering into
compensated traditional surrogacy arrangements. One other state, New
York, imposes only civil penalties on those entering into surrogacy
agreements. Historically, only two other states, Florida and Utah, have
ever imposed any sort of penalty for entering into compensated
surrogacy arrangements of any sort. Moreover, in the last few years,
serious efforts have been mounted to repeal the restrictive laws still in
place in Washington, Washington, D.C., and New York. 315
Moreover, to the extent that some of these laws encompass
gestational surrogacy, it probably was not their intended target. The first
reported case of successful gestational surrogacy was in 1985, 316 and by
1988—when the Baby M case was decided—there had only been a total
of three births to gestational surrogates in the United States.317 Thus,
when these laws were being considered, gestational surrogacy was still
in its infancy and legislators may not have been focused on the
distinctions between traditional and gestational surrogacy.
This brief spurt of anti-surrogacy legislative activity was the very sort
of “short-run departure[] . . . brought about by temporary majorities who
are insufficiently sensitive to the claims of history” 318 that the
substantive component of the Due Process Clause was designed to
protect. Just as with the prohibitions on same-sex marriage in modern
times, the public reaction to something they were unfamiliar with

Surrogacy Bill, KSHB KAN. CITY, http://www.kshb.com/news/local-news/lawmakers-decide-onsurrogacy-bill (last visited June 17, 2014).
314. See H.R. 187, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2014); Letter from Bobby Jindal, Governor of La.,
to Alfred Speer, Clerk of the H.R. (May 30, 2014), available at http://legis.la.gov/Legis/
ViewDocument.aspx?d=911932 (notifying Mr. Speer of his veto of H.R. 187).
315. See supra notes 310–312.
316. See FAITH MERINO, GLOBAL ISSUES: ADOPTION AND SURROGATE PREGNANCY 38 (2010).
317. See Tom Paulson, ‘Host Womb’ Babies Born in Tacoma—Woman Gives Birth to Her Own
Nephews After Embryo Transfer, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 15, 1988, at A1.
318. Sunstein, supra note 166, at 1163; accord Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 718 (9th
Cir. 1989) (Norris, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Sunstein, supra note 166, at 1163);
Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 377 n.12 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (Anderson, J., dissenting) (citing
Sunstein, supra note 166, at 1171); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 342 (D.C. 1993)
(Ferren, A.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Sunstein, supra note 165, at 1163).
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resulted in knee-jerk reactive legislation from politicians across the
political spectrum. Thus, the bills in Congress that would have
criminalized surrogacy on a nationwide basis had a range of cosponsors
from across the political spectrum, from the very conservative Robert K.
Dornan, Henry Hyde, and Newt Gingrich to the very liberal Barbara
Boxer, Nancy Pelosi, and Marcy Kaptur. 319 In New Jersey, when the
Baby M trial was taking place, a group of feminists that included Betty
Friedan, Meryl Streep, Carly Simon, Nora Ephron, and Gloria Steinem
wrote a letter endorsing the surrogate’s custody claim and in opposition
to compensated surrogacy. 320 When New York outlawed surrogacy in
the wake of the Baby M case, it was a result of a concerted effort
involving the New York Catholic Conference working with the New
York Civil Liberties Union and the National Organization for Women.321
And in Washington State, the anti-surrogacy law garnered support from
across the political spectrum, 322 with self-proclaimed feminists split on
the issue. 323
Moreover, that surrogacy has taken place for so much of history free
of any governmental interference, 324 and that even at the peak of antisurrogacy sentiment only a handful of states enacting legislation

319. See Commercialized Childbearing Act of 1989, H.R. 1188, 101st Cong. (1989); AntiSurrogate Mother Act of 1989, H.R. 576, 101st Cong. (1989); Surrogacy Arrangements Act of
1989, H.R. 275, 101st Cong. (1989); Anti-Surrogate Mother Act of 1987, H.R. 3264, 100th Cong.
(1987); Surrogacy Arrangements Act of 1987, H.R. 2433, 100th Cong. (1987). See generally FIELD,
supra note 290, at 155–56.
320. See Iver Peterson, Fitness Test for Baby’s Mother Unfair, Feminists Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
20, 1987, at B1.
321. See Anemona Hartocollis, And Surrogacy Makes 3, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2014, at E1;
SUSAN MARKENS, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD AND THE POLITICS OF REPRODUCTION 139–70
(2007).
322. See Bill Banning Paid Child-Bearing Deals Advances, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 9, 1989, at B11
(noting support of anti-surrogacy laws by both Democrats and Republicans); Simon, supra note
299, at E1 (noting support of anti-surrogacy laws by both Democrats and Republicans).
323. See Simon, supra note 299, at E1.
324. A few lower court decisions have held that it is not enough for there to be a history of noninterference with the right, but instead there must be a history of affirmative protection of the right
at issue; in other words, positive statutes declaring the right at issue to be a protected one. See
Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1244–45 (11th Cir. 2004); Lofton v. Sec’y of
Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 816 n.15 (11th Cir. 2004). But as most lower
courts have correctly noted, the Supreme Court’s decisions do not require a showing of a history of
affirmative protection of the right at issue, and point out that if this were in fact a requirement, the
contraception and abortion cases would have been decided differently since there was no history of
statutes affirmatively protecting those rights. See Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 53–54 (1st Cir. 2008);
Williams, 378 F.3d at 1257–58 (Barkett, J., dissenting); Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children &
Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275, 1308–09 & 1309 n.49 (11th Cir. 2004) (Barkett, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc).
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restricting surrogacy, makes its claim to being a practice deeply rooted
in history and tradition far more compelling than virtually any other
claimed fundamental right that the Court has considered. Thus, for
example, in Roe, the Court found that the right to abortion was deeply
rooted in history and tradition despite the fact that states began to restrict
the right as early as 1821; that by the time the Fourteenth Amendment
was ratified, thirty-six states and territories had enacted laws restricting
the right; and that in the 1950s a large majority of states prohibited
abortion in most instances. 325 In finding the right to procure an abortion
to be a protected one, the Roe Court focused on the fact that the right
was freely exercised at common law at the time the Constitution was
adopted and early in the nineteenth century. 326 In contrast, the Bowers
Court, in rejecting the claimed right, focused on the fact that sodomy
was criminalized at common law and by all of the original colonies, by
nearly all of the states at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified, by all fifty states until 1961, and by about half of the states at
the time of the decision. 327 Similarly, in Glucksberg, in rejecting the
claimed right, the Court focused on the fact that suicide and assisted
suicide were criminalized at common law, by the original colonies, by a
majority of the states at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified, and by nearly all states at the time of the decision.328 Surrogacy,
having been unregulated until the late 1980s and then only briefly and by
a handful of states, makes the arguments for treating it as a right deeply
rooted in history and tradition indisputable given these guideposts. 329
Moreover, as indicated above, in Lawrence, the Court held that even
if laws are on the books, their non-enforcement is a relevant
consideration, since non-enforcement is tantamount to non-interference.
Yet as Justice Scalia noted, there was still some enforcement of sodomy
laws historically, with his research turning up “203 prosecutions for
consensual, adult homosexual sodomy reported in the West Reporting
system and official state reporters from the years 1880–1995” and
“records of 20 sodomy prosecutions and 4 executions during the colonial

325. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 139–40 (1973); id. at 174–76 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
326. See id. at 140.
327. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192–94 (1986).
328. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710–16 (1997).
329. Cf. Latta v. Otter, No. 1:13–cv–0482, 2014 WL 1909999, at *13 (D. Idaho May 13, 2014),
aff’d, 2014 WL 4977682 (9th Cir. Oct. 7, 2014) (noting, in a case involving a challenge to a law
prohibiting same-sex marriage, that “[f]ar from a uniform pattern of laws rejecting the practice
[found in Glucksberg], a fast-growing number of states now recognize that same-sex and oppositesex marriages are equal”).
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period.” 330 In contrast, there is no record whatsoever of anyone in the
United States ever being prosecuted, let alone convicted, for entering
into a surrogacy arrangement. Thus, any weight to be accorded to even
this brief period of interference with the right to enter into surrogacy
arrangements is negated by the non-enforcement of these laws.
In addition, Lawrence indicated that consideration should also be
given to contemporary developments that demonstrate an “emerging
awareness” that a particular right is worthy of protection. 331 In this
regard, one could argue that actual decriminalization of surrogacy in
some states, coupled with efforts to decriminalize in others, and the
various laws enacted to facilitate surrogacy arrangements in states that
previously had no law on the subject, collectively demonstrate an
“emerging awareness” that surrogacy is a protected right.
Finally, for purposes of recognizing surrogacy as a fundamental right,
it is not necessary to distinguish between compensated and
uncompensated surrogacy. While it is true that in Lawrence, the Court
distinguished between the uncompensated sexual activity at issue in the
case before it and the compensated sexual activity where prostitution is
involved, noting that the case before it “does not
involve . . . prostitution,” 332 that does not mean that activities that
involve compensation can never fall within the scope of a fundamental
right. After all, the rights to an abortion or to contraception do not lose
their protected status merely because the person seeking to exercise that
right has to pay a third party, such as a doctor or a pharmacist, to procure
the abortion or to obtain the contraception. 333 Rather, the limiting
proviso in Lawrence, which also referred to a variety of other things that
the case did not involve, including minors, coercion, or legal recognition
of a relationship, 334 was designed to cabin the scope of Lawrence itself
and, perhaps, to respond to a Pandora’s Box that Justice Scalia claimed
was opened by the decision. 335 Indeed, prostitution stands in stark
330. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 597 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
331. Id. at 571–72.
332. See id. at 578.
333. See, e.g., Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Alabama, 378 F.2d 1232, 1242 (11th Cir. 2004) (“For
purposes of constitutional analysis, restrictions on the ability to purchase an item are tantamount to
restrictions on the use of that item. . . . [P]rohibitions on the sale of contraceptives have been
analyzed as burdens on the use of contraceptives. . . . Because a prohibition on the distribution of
sexual devices would burden an individual’s ability to use the devices, our analysis must be framed
not simply in terms of whether the Constitution protects a right to sell and buy sexual devices, but
whether it protects a right to use such devices.” (emphasis in original)).
334. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
335. See id. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult
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contrast to surrogacy—compensated or not—in that the former has a
long history of being criminalized in the United States while the latter
does not. Prostitution also stands in stark contrast to consensual sodomy
in that prostitution laws have been consistently enforced and have
remained in force while sodomy laws have been steadily repealed over
time and even when on the books have not been enforced. This is not to
say that the distinction between compensated and uncompensated
surrogacy is irrelevant. Instead, the presence or absence of
compensation, as I discuss in the next section, is pertinent in assessing
the governmental objectives and the means for accomplishing them
when applying strict scrutiny to such laws.
In sum, no matter which of the various approaches to framing and
recognizing fundamental rights is employed, laws prohibiting or
restricting access to surrogacy infringe upon a fundamental right
protected substantively by the Due Process Clause. Yet, to be clear, I am
not contending that all of the restrictive laws discussed in Part I of this
Article fall within the scope of that right. Rather, only those laws that
actually prohibit parties from entering into surrogacy agreements—such
as those laws that impose criminal penalties on parties entering into
them—or those laws designed to discourage parties from proceeding
with surrogacy arrangements—such as the FDA regulations that seek to
deter women from serving as surrogates to gay men 336—can be said to
infringe upon the broader right to procreate or the narrower right to
procreate through the assistance of a surrogate. In contrast, those laws
that merely declare such agreements to be unenforceable, I would argue,
are outside the scope of these two fundamental rights. This is because
the substantive component of the Due Process Clause protects only
“negative liberties,” meaning that it only requires that the government
leave people alone; it does not require the government to affirmatively
incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are likewise
sustainable only in light of Bowers’ validation of laws based on moral choices. Every single one of
these laws is called into question by today’s decision.”).
336. The mere fact that a law does not prohibit the exercise of a fundamental right, but instead
seeks to make it more difficult or burdensome to exercise that right, does not insulate it from
constitutional attack. Thus, for example, in the abortion context, the Court has held that “[a]n undue
burden exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place
substantial obstacles in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.”
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (emphasis added). In the samesex marriage context, one court has noted that if laws like the Defense of Marriage Act are designed
to discourage same-sex couples from having children by making it less desirable, harder, or more
expensive to do so, they are subject to challenge on the ground that they infringe upon the
fundamental right to procreate. See Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 341 (D.
Conn. 2012).
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act. 337 Thus, while challenges to laws criminalizing surrogacy and the
FDA regulations further the negative liberty of procreating without
governmental interference, challenges to the laws declaring surrogacy
contracts to be unenforceable seek to get the government to affirmatively
act to enforce such agreements, which would not be consistent with the
history of substantive due process. 338 Those laws that present barriers to
establishing parentage are somewhat more complex and are treated
separately in Part III of this Article.
2.

Application of Strict Scrutiny

To conclude that surrogacy is either a free-standing fundamental right
or a subset of the fundamental right to procreate is not the end of the
analysis. As the handful of courts to consider the issue have correctly
noted, this does not mean that all laws regarding surrogacy are thereby
declared unconstitutional; rather, it means that they must be subjected to
strict scrutiny, 339 meaning that the law must be narrowly tailored to
further a compelling governmental interest.340
With respect to laws criminalizing or otherwise prohibiting
compensated surrogacy, courts have identified four arguably compelling
337. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 194–99 (1989);
Sandage v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Vanderburgh Cnty., 548 F.3d 595, 596–97 (7th Cir. 2008); Lofton v.
Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 815, 817 (11th Cir. 2004); Cain, supra
note 166, at 37–40.
338. This is not to say that the laws declaring surrogacy contracts unenforceable are not subject to
constitutional challenge on some other ground. For example, as indicated in Part I, some of the laws
render such agreements enforceable only when entered into by an opposite-sex couple, not when
entered into by a same-sex couple. Such laws discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, and are
thus subject to a class-based equal protection challenge using the as-yet undetermined “heightened”
level of scrutiny that the Court appears to apply to such classifications. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at
580 (O’Connor, J., concurring); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 479–84
(9th Cir. 2014). Arguments that same-sex parents are inferior to opposite-sex ones have been
rejected in recent litigation regarding same-sex marriage, and thus would likely be rejected as a
basis for justifying such laws. See Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 383 (4th Cir. 2014), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 308 (2014); Geiger v. Kitzhaber, Nos. 6:13–cv–0184 & 6:13–cv–02256–MC,
2014 WL 2054264, at *12 (D. Or. May 19, 2014); De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 651, 653
(W.D. Tex. 2014); Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 319 (D. Conn. 2012).
339. See Doe v. Attorney Gen., 487 N.W.2d 484, 486 (Mich. App. 1992).
340. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997). Although the Court has
applied a lower level of scrutiny to laws restricting the right to an abortion, and although, as
discussed above, Lawrence may be ushering a new mid-tier level of scrutiny for some types of
rights protected substantively by the Due Process Clause, the default rule remains, as articulated in
Glucksberg, that strict scrutiny applies to infringements upon fundamental rights. In any event, the
Court’s application of intermediate scrutiny in recent years is not significantly different from strict
scrutiny. See generally United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); id. at 570–74, 596 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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governmental interests: first, protecting women—particularly lowerincome women—from exploitation; 341 second, preventing children from
becoming mere commodities; 342 third, preventing future emotional harm
to children who later learn they were born as the result of a commercial
transaction; 343 and fourth, avoiding the emotional disruption to a
surrogate that results from her being separated from the child she gives
birth to. 344
To be sure, all of these interests sound like perfectly reasonable ones
for the government to be concerned about, and one could easily
speculate that, at least in some instances, compensated surrogacy might
create some of the above enumerated risks. And if one were applying
traditional rational basis review, such “rational speculation unsupported
by evidence or empirical data” would suffice.345 Yet where, as here,
strict scrutiny is involved, reasoned speculation does not suffice; there
must be evidence that the law will actually further these interests.346 Yet
as some courts have noted, there is no empirical evidence showing that
surrogacy arrangements result in the exploitation of poor women or the
commodification of children. 347
Moreover, even if prohibiting surrogacy will, in some instances,
further these interests, a ban on all surrogacy arrangements, regardless of
the presence or absence of these dangers, is too over-inclusive to satisfy

341. See Doe, 487 N.W.2d at 487.
342. See Soos v. Superior Court of Maricopa, 897 P.2d 1356, 1361 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (Gerber,
J., specially concurring); Doe, 487 N.W.2d at 486–87.
343. See Doe, 487 N.W.2d at 487.
344. See Soos, 897 P.2d at 1361 (Gerber, J., specially concurring).
345. F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993).
346. See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 227–28 (1984); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193,
1218–19, 1222–23 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014). Similarly, in the abortion
context, in applying the undue burden test, several courts have held that when an abortion restriction
is justified on the ground of furthering maternal health, the strength of those grounds must be
assessed—by resort to evidence—and balanced against the burden on women seeking an abortion.
See Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 911–14 (9th Cir. 2014); Planned
Parenthood of Wis. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 798 (7th Cir. 2013). But see Planned Parenthood
of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583, 590, 593–96 (5th Cir. 2014)
(holding that the strength of the regulation’s rationale plays no role in the undue burden analysis);
Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc., 738 F.3d at 799–800 (Manion, J., concurring in part and in the
judgment) (same).
347. See J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1288–89 (D. Utah 2002); Johnson v. Calvert, 851
P.2d 776, 785 (Cal. 1993). This is not to say that a woman’s financial state in no way impacts her
decision to serve as a surrogate, but as the Calvert Court explained, there is “no proof that surrogacy
contracts exploit poor women to any greater degree than economic necessity in general exploits
them by inducing them to accept lower-paid or otherwise undesirable employment.” Calvert, 851
P.2d at 785.
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strict scrutiny’s narrow tailoring requirement. Thus, for example, if one
is concerned about the risk that poor women might be exploited by
surrogacy arrangements, there are more fine-tuned ways short of an
outright ban on compensated surrogacy to further that interest. One such
alternative would be court preapproval of surrogacy contracts in which
the judge can make an individualized determination about the possibility
of exploitation. 348 This distinction between a blunt and a fine-tuned
approach is akin to the way the Court has applied strict scrutiny in its
race-based affirmative action cases and its cases involving the
application of presumptions regarding parental fitness. The Court has
held that race-based affirmative action grounded in diversity requires an
individualized assessment of each applicant rather than blunt tools such
as quotas, 349 and that a state cannot apply a blunt presumption—such as
that unwed fathers are presumed to be unfit to raise their children—to
terminate parental custody rights, but must instead hold an
individualized hearing on parental fitness. 350
Moreover, laws that permit uncompensated surrogacy while
prohibiting compensated surrogacy do not necessarily avoid the risk of
exploitation. After all, when one family member is in need of the
assistance of a surrogate, family pressure could easily be placed on a
female family member in a position to serve as their uncompensated
surrogate. In contrast, an unrelated surrogate in an arm’s length
relationship with intended parents is in a much better position to walk
away from a situation that she feels uncomfortable about. 351
If one is concerned about the commodification of children and the
emotional harms that surrogacy could cause such children in the future,
one can enact restrictions calculated to further that specific goal, such as
laws that prohibit variable compensation for an egg donor’s traits or that
impose caps on compensation for egg donors and surrogates, or laws that
348. See J.R., 261 F. Supp. 2d at 1288 n.34.
349. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003).
350. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 646–47, 654–58 (1972). In litigation regarding the
right to same-sex marriage and parenting, lower courts have relied on Stanley for the proposition
that where heightened scrutiny is involved, courts cannot rely on broad generalizations about the
fitness of gays and lesbians to parent. See Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1225–26 (10th Cir.
2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014); De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 651, 654 (W.D.
Tex. 2014); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 479 (E.D. Va. 2014); In re Adoption of Doe,
2008 WL 5070056, at *32–*33 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 29, 2008); Florida Dep’t of Health &
Rehabilitative Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1227–29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993), approved in
part, quashed in part, 656 So. 2d 902 (1995).
351. See, e.g., Tim Barlass, When Altruistic Surrogacy Goes Wrong, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD
(Aug. 10, 2014), http://www.smh.com.au/national/when-altruistic-surrogacy-goes-wrong-20140809101bo5.html.
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prohibit sex-selective embryo implantation. If one is concerned about the
emotional harm to a surrogate of being separated from the child,
mandatory psychological screening of the sort present in some of the
statutes examined in Part I is a more fine-tuned way to minimize those
risks. Additionally, a state could distinguish between traditional and
gestational surrogacy, for the risks of such harm seem far more acute for
the former than the latter.
For similar reasons, the FDA regulations declaring any man who has
had sex with another man in the past five years to be an ineligible donor
are too blunt a tool to survive strict scrutiny. The governmental
interest—preventing women from contracting HIV and other sexually
transmitted diseases—is easily a compelling one. Yet there are far more
fine-tuned ways to further this objective, such as requiring the donor’s
semen sample to be frozen and testing the donor for HIV and other
sexually transmitted diseases several months later, when the risk of a
false negative is no longer a realistic risk. 352 Indeed, the FDA
regulations, targeted against a specific group, gay men, raise in a very
real way the eugenics concerns that the Skinner Court invoked for
applying strict scrutiny to laws infringing upon the right to procreate. 353
Moreover, for two additional reasons, those anti-surrogacy statutes
imposing criminal liability on any actor are particularly vulnerable when
strict scrutiny is applied. First, in virtually every major case in the
Court’s fundamental rights line of cases 354—as well as in the Court’s
interracial marriage and cohabitation cases 355—the Court struck down
laws that imposed criminal sanctions. In these cases the Court, or at least
individual Justices, often noted that the criminal nature of the laws made

352. See John G. Culhane, Bad Science, Worse Policy: The Exclusion of Gay Males from Donor
Pools, 24 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 129, 137–44 (2005).
353. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex. rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Luke A. Boso,
Comment, The Unjust Exclusion of Gay Sperm Donors: Litigation Strategies to End Discrimination
in the Gene Pool, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 843, 872–73 (2008); Alissa Stockage, Note, Regulating
Multiple Birth Pregnancies: Comparing the United Kingdom’s Comprehensive Regulatory Scheme
with the United States’ Progressive, Intimate Decision-Making Approach, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L.
559, 583 (2010).
354. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978);
Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494
(1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner, 316 U.S. 535; Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
355. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
Although the portions of these two decisions in which the Court made note of the laws’ criminal
sanctions were formally decided on equal protection grounds, they were subsequently characterized
by the Court as being part of the Court’s fundamental rights line of cases.
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them particularly vulnerable. 356 Indeed, in recent challenges to laws
prohibiting same-sex marriage or adoption, or laws prohibiting gays
from serving in the military, lower court judges have noted the civil
nature of these laws in distinguishing them from the Court’s
fundamental rights cases. 357
Second, as indicated above, while some of the anti-surrogacy laws
impose criminal liability on intermediaries who help facilitate surrogacy
contracts, others go further and impose criminal liability on those
entering into the surrogacy contract; in other words, the surrogate and
the intended parents. Drawing an analogy to the abortion context, in
which the Court applies not strict scrutiny but the more relaxed “undue
burden” standard, this would be the equivalent of imposing criminal
liability not only on the doctor who performs an outlawed abortion, but
also on the pregnant woman who has the abortion performed on her. Yet,
neither the Supreme Court nor any lower court has ever upheld an
abortion law that imposed criminal liability on the woman seeking an
abortion, but only on third parties who perform or facilitate abortions.
Indeed, a lower court recently struck down an abortion law for its
unprecedented criminalization of the conduct of the woman procuring
the abortion. 358
In sum, legislatures are not prohibited from enacting sensible
regulatory schemes in an effort to protect would-be surrogates and the
children born to them. But they cannot further these interests by using
the blunt tool of prohibition, particularly when coupled with criminal
sanctions. Rather, they must enact fine-tuned and highly individualized
regulations designed to minimize infringing upon the fundamental right
to procreate.
III. THE RIGHT TO ESTABLISH LEGAL PARENTAGE OF
CHILDREN BORN VIA SURROGACY
Even in states that have not enacted laws prohibiting people from
entering into surrogacy contracts, there remain other potential barriers to
356. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575–76 (2003); id. at 581–82 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Loving,
388 U.S. at 11 (1967); id. at 13 (Stewart, J., concurring); McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 192 (1964); id. at
198 (Stewart, J., concurring); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
357. See Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 548 F.3d 1264, 1270 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)
(O’Scannlain, J., dissenting); Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804,
817 (11th Cir. 2004); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 16–18 (N.Y. 2006); Andersen v. King
Cnty., 158 Wash. 2d 1, 51–52, 138 P.3d 963, 990 (Wash. 2006).
358. See McCormack v. Hiedeman, 694 F.3d 1004, 1010–14 (9th Cir. 2012); McCormack v.
Hiedeman, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1144–45 (D. Idaho 2013).
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becoming a parent via surrogacy. While these states do not stand in the
way of intended parents’ right to procreate—if by procreation one
literally means creating human life using your genetic material—they do
stand in the way of the intended parents’ ability to establish legal
parentage of the children produced as a result of surrogacy. In some
states, this has been accomplished by laws specifically declaring that a
surrogate mother is the legal mother of any child born to her and that her
husband—if she is married—is the legal father. 359 Other statutory
schemes, while not specific to surrogacy, provide that maternity is
established by giving birth to a child and that a woman’s husband, if the
woman is married, is presumed to be the legal father. 360 Moreover, in
some of these statutory regimes, these presumptions can only be
challenged—if at all—by the woman, her husband, and perhaps the child
itself, not by third persons. 361 These laws thus stand in the way of
intended parents establishing legal parentage of children genetically
related to one or both of them—and not genetically related to the
surrogate or her husband—either if there is a dispute between the
intended parents and the surrogate 362 or, in some instances, even if the
surrogate supports the efforts of the intended parents to establish
parentage. 363
The question thus arises, is there a fundamental right not only to
procreate via surrogacy, but also to have one’s legal parentage to the
children born via surrogacy established by the state? There are a number
of ways to argue such a right. The first is to contend that establishment
of legal parentage is part and parcel of the fundamental right to
procreate, and therefore statutory schemes that prevent intended parents
who are also the genetic parents from establishing legal parentage
infringe upon that right. The second is to argue that establishment of
legal parentage is part of a separate fundamental right—the right to care,
custody, and control of one’s children. And the third is to make a classbased equal protection argument, either from the standpoint of the
intended parents or the children born of surrogacy arrangements. I
consider each of these arguments in turn.

359. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218(B)–(C) (Westlaw through 2d Reg. & Special
Sess. 2014); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-18-05 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.).
360. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 184–185 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.).
361. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.187, 191, 197 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.).
362. See, e.g., Soos v. Superior Court of Maricopa, 897 P.2d 1356, 1359–61 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1994).
363. See, e.g., J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (D. Utah 2002).
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Fundamental Right to Establish Legal Parentage

A few courts have interpreted the establishment of legal parentage as
part and parcel of the fundamental right to procreate, and have thus held
that statutory schemes that prevent intended parents who are also the
genetic parents from establishing legal parentage infringe upon that
right. 364
On the one hand, such an interpretation makes sense. The
fundamental right to procreate would seem to be of little utility if one
could not have legal parentage, and therefore custody of, the children
that result from the act of procreation, whether done through natural
means or via assisted reproduction. Moreover, just as the Court in
Griswold held that unenumerated rights can be found in the penumbras
of the Bill of Rights and that these penumbral rights are “necessary in
making the express guarantees fully meaningful,” 365 so too the Court has
recognized that unenumerated rights themselves have penumbras. Thus,
for example, in Carey v. Population Services International, 366 the Court
held that the right to use contraceptives recognized in Griswold includes
a penumbral right to the purchase and sale of the same free of
governmental interference.367
There is, however, a problem with such an argument, even if as a
general matter it is correct to argue that unenumerated rights have
penumbral extensions. As indicated in Part II, the substantive component
of the Due Process Clause protects only “negative liberties,” meaning
that it only requires that the government leave people alone, but does not
require the government to affirmatively act.368 In a case such as Carey,
364. Typically, these courts do not cite the right to procreate, standing alone, but rather appear to
mix the precedents involving the right to procreate with the right to care, custody, and control of
one’s children. See T.V. v. New York Dep’t of Health, 929 N.Y.S.2d 139, 150–53 (N.Y. App. Div.
2011); J.R., 261 F. Supp. 2d at 1275–78; Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 766 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl.
1994); Soos, 897 P.2d at 1359–61.
365. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483–84 (1965).
366. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
367. See id. at 687–88; accord Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.2d 1232, 1242 (11th Cir.
2004) (“For purposes of constitutional analysis, restrictions on the ability to purchase an item are
tantamount to restrictions on the use of that item. . . . [P]rohibitions on the sale of contraceptives
have been analyzed as burdens on the use of contraceptives. . . . Because a prohibition on the
distribution of sexual devices would burden an individual’s ability to use the devices, our analysis
must be framed not simply in terms of whether the Constitution protects a right to sell and buy
sexual devices, but whether it protects a right to use such devices.” (emphasis in original)).
368. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 194–99 (1989);
Sandage v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Vanderburgh Cnty., 548 F.3d 595, 596–97 (7th Cir. 2008); Lofton v.
Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 815, 817 (11th Cir 2004); Cain, supra
note 166, at 37–40.
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enforcing both the “core” right at issue—the right to use
contraceptives—and the penumbral right—the right to purchase and sell
the same—involve negative liberties in that the government is not being
asked to affirmatively act, but merely to refrain from interfering with the
exercise of the underlying rights. In contrast, holding that the
fundamental right to procreate includes a penumbral right to have the
government declare the legal parentage of the intended parents is
requiring the government to affirmatively act, akin to arguing that the
government must also enforce surrogacy contracts in the first instance.
In the contraception or abortion contexts, this would be the equivalent of
holding that those fundamental rights include a penumbral right to have
the government pay for contraception and abortions, which the Court has
clearly rejected. 369
A more doctrinally sound way to challenge the constitutionality of
these statutory schemes on fundamental rights grounds is to invoke the
related but distinct fundamental right to care, custody, and control of
one’s children. This long-standing right was first established during the
Lochner era in a pair of cases that predate Skinner and that have gone on
to serve as the foundation for most modern substantive due process
jurisprudence. 370 First, in Meyer v. Nebraska, 371 the Court declared
unconstitutional a state law making it a crime to teach any subject prior
to the eighth grade in any language other than English, holding that the
Due Process Clause protects the right “to marry, establish a home and
bring up children,” 372 and that the law at issue interfered with this
right. 373 Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 374 the Court
struck down a state law that required all children between eight and
sixteen years of age to attend public schools (as contrasted with private
schools), concluding that “[u]nder the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska,”
the law “unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their

369. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196 (citing McRae for the more general proposition that “the Due
Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may
be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not
deprive the individual”); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317–18 (1980).
370. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 761–63 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring)
(providing a historical overview of the development of the Court’s modern substantive due process
line of cases).
371. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
372. Id. at 399.
373. Id. at 402–03.
374. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).

13 - Nicolas_Final for Publication.docx (Do Not Delete)

1302

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

12/16/2014 6:32 PM

[Vol. 89:1235

control.” 375 In Troxel v. Granville 376—a case involving a challenge to a
Washington State statute that allowed any nonparent third party to
petition for visitation rights—the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the
continued vitality of these early precedents. In Troxel, the Court cited
Meyer and Pierce and held that “[t]he liberty interest at issue in [the]
case—the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their
children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests
recognized by this Court.” 377
In its decisions summarizing the rights recognized as fundamental
under the Due Process Clause, the Court itself has treated the rights to
procreate and to care, custody, and control of one’s children as
independent rights. 378 Moreover, lower courts considering substantive
due process challenges to statutory schemes that stand in the way of
intended parents establishing legal parentage have distinguished the two
rights from one another, 379 and have held that such statutory schemes
interfere with the right to care, custody, and control of one’s children. 380
The distinction is not merely semantic, but converts what would
otherwise appear to be a demand that the government affirmatively act
into a demand for governmental non-interference, which aligns the relief
sought with the theoretical limitations of substantive due process. Here,
the underlying fundamental right is the right to care, custody, and
control of one’s children free of governmental interference. Yet in these
cases, the government—by enforcing legal presumptions that make the
surrogate and her husband the child’s legal parents—is interfering with
the intended parents’ fundamental right to care, custody, and control of
their children.
Assuming that it is sound to view this as part of the fundamental right
to care, custody, and control of one’s children, the application of these
presumptions would likely fail strict scrutiny for reasons similar to those
examined in the previous section, specifically, that the presumptions are
too blunt a tool to further any conceivable governmental interests. In
justifying the application of these presumptions to deny intended parents
who are genetically related to children born to a gestational surrogate the
375. Id. at 534–35.
376. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
377. Id. at 65.
378. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (referring in the disjunctive to “[t]he rights
to conceive and to raise one’s children”); accord Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 447 (1990).
379. See, e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1253–54 (N.J. 1988).
380. See D.M.T. v. T.M.H., 129 So. 3d 320, 335–39 (Fla. 2013); J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d
1268, 1275–78, 1293–98 (D. Utah 2002).
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ability to establish legal parentage, two governmental interests have
typically been invoked: first, that surrogacy agreements result in a
custody decision that may not be in the best interests of the child; and
second, that such a presumption protects the surrogate’s emotional wellbeing by protecting her interest in a relationship with the child. 381 Yet
courts have correctly rejected these justifications, noting that conclusive
presumptions that the surrogate and her husband are the legal parents—
in lieu of an individual hearing to determine what custody arrangement
is in the child’s best interest or the impact on a surrogate’s well-being—
fail the narrow tailoring requirement of strict scrutiny. 382
There is, however, a serious hurdle to overcome in arguing that the
fundamental right to care, custody, and control of one’s genetic children
encompasses a right to establish that parentage in the face of these
statutory presumptions. The presumption that a woman who gives birth
to a child is the child’s mother, 383 as well as the presumption that her
husband is the child’s father, have a longstanding historical pedigree at
common law as well as in historical U.S. practice. 384
Indeed, as indicated in Part II of this Article, the U.S. Supreme Court,
in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 385 rejected a substantive due process
challenge, brought by a man purporting to be the natural father of a
child, to a state law that conclusively presumed a woman’s husband to
be the father of a child, with only a limited time period for either the
husband or wife, but not third persons, to use blood tests to challenge the
presumption. 386 In so holding, the Court relied on the longstanding
historical pedigree of the presumption and the fact that it could not
historically be challenged by anyone other than the husband or wife (and
in many cases, not even by them). 387 The natural father invoked a series
of cases that grew out of the Court’s Meyer and Pierce line of cases in
which the Court held that the natural father of a child born to an unwed
mother has a right to establish legal parentage to that child.388 In that line
381. See J.R., 261 F. Supp. 2d at 1284–88, 1284 n.24, 1288 n.34 (D. Utah 2002).
382. See id. (considering various rationales for such presumptions and demonstrating that such
presumptions are not narrowly tailored to further those rationales).
383. See In re F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d 634, 644 (Wis. 2013); D.M.T., 129 So. 3d at 355–56 (Polston,
C.J., dissenting); In re Adoption of Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d 677, 679 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2009); In re
C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 728 (Tenn. 2005); Barabas v. Rogers, 868 S.W.2d 283, 286 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2003).
384. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124–26 (1989).
385. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
386. See id. at 124–27.
387. See id.
388. See id. at 123, 128–29.
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of cases, the Court held that by virtue of his biological link to the child,
such a father has an inchoate right that develops into a full-fledged
fundamental due process right to care, custody, and control if he takes
affirmative steps to develop that relationship 389 (a line of cases that
would certainly be directly on point in the situation in which an intended
genetic father claimed parentage to a child born to an unwed surrogate
mother). The Court rejected the purported natural father’s reliance on
this line of cases, 390 treating this in effect as a historical gloss on the
scope of the fundamental right to care, custody, and control of one’s
children. In other words, because as a matter of historical practice, the
government has always interfered with the right of natural fathers in this
circumstance, the right to challenge such laws cannot be said to be a
fundamental right deeply rooted in history and tradition.
Michael H. is a potentially insurmountable obstacle in trying to argue
that intended parents have a fundamental right to establish legal
parentage. True, the Michael H. case took place in the context of an
adulterous affair and thus the presumption served its historic purposes in
promoting marital harmony and the legitimization of children, 391 neither
of which would likely be implicated in the surrogacy context. Yet, while
that distinction might be relevant had the Court held that the
fundamental right to care, custody, and control was implicated but that
the presumption furthered compelling governmental interests, that is not
what the Court held. Rather, the Court held that the longstanding
existence of this presumption meant that the right to care, custody, and
control was not even implicated in the case, thus allowing the
government to pursue any rational objectives. 392
However, if, as was considered in Part II, Lawrence in fact refined the
Glucksberg inquiry to permit a consideration not merely of longstanding
history and tradition, but also more contemporary legal developments,
there is a strong basis for concluding that in the surrogacy context, there
is an “emerging awareness” that the intended parents should be able to
establish their legal parentage. Recall that in Lawrence, the Court
reasoned that “our laws and traditions in the past half century are of
most relevance here,” which the Court described as showing “an
389. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256–62 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,
389, 397 (1979) (decided on equal protection grounds but subsequently recharacterized as due
process); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 254–55 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651
(1961).
390. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123, 128–29.
391. See id. at 124–25.
392. See id. at 129–32.

13 - Nicolas_Final for Publication.docx (Do Not Delete)

2014]

STRADDLING THE COLUMBIA

12/16/20146:32 PM

1305

emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult
persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters
pertaining to sex.” 393 The Court also held that “[t]his emerging
recognition should have been apparent when Bowers was decided.” 394
The Court described this “emerging awareness” as consisting of: (1) the
1955 Model Penal Code’s recommendation that there be no criminal
penalties for sexual relations conducted in private; (2) that between that
point in time and the decision in Bowers, half of the states repealed their
criminal penalties for consensual sodomy; (3) that states with sodomy
laws on the books were not enforcing them; and (4) that sodomy laws
were repealed in the United Kingdom and that the European Court of
Human Rights declared such laws to violate the European Convention
on Human Rights. 395
In a variety of ways, contemporary legal developments regarding the
establishment of legal parentage in the surrogacy context track the
guideposts identified in Lawrence as constituting an “emerging
awareness.” 396 The 2002 version of the Uniform Parentage Act similarly
contains provisions designed to deal with the possibility that a child will
be born to a gestational carrier, and accordingly provides for the
intended parents, rather than the surrogate and her husband, to be
recognized as the legal parents of the child.397 At least twenty-five
percent of the states now have provisions in their parentage statutes
indicating that where a surrogacy arrangement is involved, the woman
who gives birth is not the legal mother and her husband is not the legal
father, but instead the intended parents are the legal parents. 398 At least
an equal number, while not enacting statutory provisions specific to
393. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571–72 (2003).
394. Id. at 572.
395. See id. at 571–73.
396. Id. at 572.
397. See Uniform Parentage Act, §§ 201, 801–809, 2002 Wash. Sess. Laws 3, 11–12, 68–78
(2002).
398. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Extraordinary Sess.);
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962(f)(1) (West, Westlaw though 2014 Reg. Sess. ch. 531); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 7-48a (Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-804 (West, Westlaw
through 2014 ch. 428); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.16(7) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sp. “A” Sess.);
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47 / 15 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess. Act 98-925); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:5, 168-B:7 (West, Westlaw through ch. 330 of 2014 Reg. Sess.); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.670 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. & Special Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. § 14-18-08 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.753
(West, Westlaw through 3d Called Sess. 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-807 (West, Westlaw
through 2014 Gen. Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(D) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess. &
2014 Special Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.101(1), (8) (2012).
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surrogacy, have enacted more general provisions for challenging the
presumptions of legal maternity 399 and paternity 400 that are well-suited
for the surrogacy context, some of which allow third parties to bring the
contest. 401 Thus, the number of states that have done away with the rigid
common law presumptions has approached at least the fifty percent
mark, the percentage of states that had repealed their sodomy laws at the
time of Bowers and that the Lawrence Court indicated made it
“apparent” that there was an “emerging awareness” that the right was a
protected one. 402 Finally, in 2014, the European Court of Human Rights
declared that even though France did not need to permit surrogacy
within the country, France’s refusal to recognize French intended parents
as the legal parents of children born outside of France to surrogate
mothers violated the European Convention on Human Rights. 403
In sum, although the ability of intended parents to establish legal
parentage of children born to a surrogate may not be a component of the
fundamental right to procreate, it is potentially a component of the
fundamental right to care, custody, and control of one’s children.
However, this latter argument is sound only to the extent that Lawrence
in fact modified the Court’s pre-existing framework for recognizing
fundamental rights so as to focus not only on history and tradition, but
also contemporary legal trends.
Moreover, the due process claim is likely of greatest utility in the
gestational surrogacy scenario in which the intended parents are both the
genetic parents. Where one of the intended parents is not a genetic
parent—either because a traditional surrogate is involved or a third party
399. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-122 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Reg. Sess.);
MAINE REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2761(3-A) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 50-15-221 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.17
(West, Westlaw through 2013–2014 legislation); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432.088(8) (West,
Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-25-16.7 (West, Westlaw through
2014 Reg. Sess.); W.V. CODE ANN. § 16-5-10(e) (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Extraordinary
Sess.); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-1-410(d) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Budget Sess.); P.R. LAWS
ANN. tit. 31, § 463 (Westlaw through 2011) .
400. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.04; OR. REV. CODE ANN. § 432.088(9); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 34-25-13.1.
401. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-122; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.04, 3111.17;
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-8-57 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31,
§ 463.
402. Sacramento Nonprofit Collective v. Holder, 855 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1107–08 (E.D. Cal.
2012); Marin Alliance for Med. Marijuana v. Holder, 866 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1157 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
403. See Mennesson v. France, App. No. 65192/11, (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 26, 2014), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-145389; Labassee v. France, App. No.
65941/11 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 26, 2014), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=001-145180.
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egg donor—courts have held that the non-genetic intended parent’s
fundamental rights are not at stake since those rights, at least at the
outset, are not grounded in genetic parentage. 404 Moreover, much of the
“emerging awareness” discussed above with respect to statutory
developments has involved primarily gestational, not traditional,
surrogacy. 405
That is not to say that it would be of no use in other scenarios. If, for
example, a same-sex male couple works with a gestational surrogate, the
due process claim would result in a declaration of the genetic father’s
legal parentage and the surrogate’s non-maternity, thus leaving the child
with one legal parent, the genetic father, who could then consent to
adoption by his same-sex partner.
B.

The Backstop of Equal Protection

It is conceivable that if a state law provided both that a surrogate is
conclusively presumed to be the legal mother of a child she gives birth
to and that her husband, if she is married, is conclusively presumed to be
the child’s father, that a court would reject a substantive due process
challenge to such a statutory scheme. Given the uncertain effect that
Lawrence had on Glucksberg’s fundamental rights methodology, a court
might very well hold, following the logic of Michael H., that there is no
substantive due process right for the child’s genetic parents to challenge
those presumptions and establish parentage.
However, it is rare today for a state to rigidly apply both the
presumptions of maternity and paternity. In particular, in recent decades,
several states, while maintaining their conclusive presumptions that the
woman who gives birth to a child is its mother, have made the
presumption that her husband is the father a rebuttable presumption that
can be challenged by a person alleging to be the genetic father. 406 Thus,
404. See D.M.T. v. T.M.H., 129 So. 3d 320, 339 (Fla. 2013); In re T.J.S., 16 A.3d 386, 392 (N.J.
Super. App. Div. 2011); Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 785–86 (Cal. 1993); In re Baby M, 537
A.2d 1227, 1253–54 (N.J. 1988). This is not to say that the non-biological intended parent never
obtains this fundamental right vis-à-vis the child, but until his or her legal parentage is established
via adoption or by other means, it is the genetic parents whose right to care, custody, and control is
at issue.
405. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 8-801 to 8-813 (providing a statutory scheme for
recognizing gestational surrogacy agreements while leaving traditional surrogacy agreements
unregulated); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47 / 1–75 (same); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 126.710–
126.810 (same); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:1 to 168-B:21 (same); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78b15-801 to 78b-15-809 (same).
406. See Leslie Joan Harris, The Basis for Legal Parentage and the Clash Between Custody and
Child Support, 42 IND. L. REV. 611, 622–23 (2009).
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in these states, when a child is born to a surrogate, the law is such that
the intended father can establish his parentage while the intended mother
cannot, despite the fact that both of them are the genetic parents. In these
circumstances, courts have held that it violates the Equal Protection
Clause to treat men and women differently in this way. 407 Thus, even if
due process does not require a state to soften its rigid presumptions of
maternity and paternity, once it relaxes one of those presumptions, the
Equal Protection Clause requires it to equally relax the other, which has
the effect of allowing intended parents to establish legal parentage.
Where the situation involves same-sex rather than opposite-sex
parents, there are a few ways in which the equal protection doctrine can
similarly be invoked to require the state to allow them to establish their
legal parentage. First, where same-sex female couples are involved, it is
sometimes the case that one woman will serve as the gestational mother
using the eggs of her partner.408 In this circumstance, courts have held
that to the extent the state allows a genetic father to file a declaration of
paternity, it is sex-based discrimination in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause not to likewise allow the gestating mother’s female
partner to file a declaration of maternity, resulting in both women being
treated as legal mothers. 409
Second, to the extent that a state’s statutory scheme permits oppositesex couples to establish legal parentage of a child born to a surrogate
even when one of them is not genetically related to the child but denies
that right to same-sex couples, such a law is subject to challenge on the
ground that it discriminates against the latter on the basis of sexual
orientation. 410 It would thus be subject to what appears to be an evolving
form of “heightened” scrutiny that the Court has applied to such
classifications. 411
407. These courts alternatively apply either the intermediate scrutiny associated with sex
discrimination or the strict scrutiny on the theory that the fundamental rights to procreate or to care,
custody, and control are involved. See J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1270, 1294 (D. Utah
2002); T.V. v. N.Y. Dep’t of Health, 929 N.Y.S.2d 139, 150–53 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011); Soos v.
Superior Court of Maricopa, 897 P.2d 1356, 1359–61 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994). But see In re T.J.S., 16
A.3d at 391–97 (applying heightened scrutiny but concluding that it satisfies that scrutiny). In some
instances, courts have so interpreted their statutory schemes to avoid the constitutional issue. See In
re Paternity and Maternity of Infant R., 922 N.E.2d 59, 60–62, 62 n.4 (Ind. App. 2010); In re
Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115, 119–26 (Md. 2007).
408. See, e.g., K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 675 (Cal. 2005).
409. See In re Adoption of Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d 677, 689–90 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2009).
410. See D.M.T., 129 So. 3d at 341–44 (citing In re Adoption of X.X.G., 45 So. 3d 79, 92 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2010)).
411. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring); SmithKline
Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 479–84 (9th Cir. 2014).
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Finally, the discrimination can be litigated from the standpoint of the
children whose interest in having their legal parentage established. The
Supreme Court has applied intermediate scrutiny to laws that
discriminate on the basis of illegitimacy and that discriminate against the
children of illegal aliens, reasoning that it is unjust for children to suffer
legal disadvantages for a status over which they have no control.412 And
by analogy, children of same-sex couples have no control over their
status as such, and thus discrimination against them should likewise be
subject to heightened scrutiny, even if discrimination against the parents
based on sexual orientation is entitled only to rational basis scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
The desire to procreate and raise children is an innate part of human
nature, such that the efforts of states such as Washington and a handful
of other states to prevent people otherwise unable to procreate from
becoming parents via compensated surrogacy is doomed to failure. I,
like countless people before and after me, have found ways to
circumvent these anachronistic anti-surrogacy laws.
By targeting an innate part of human nature, these laws infringe upon
two of the oldest and most fundamental protected constitutional rights:
the rights to procreate and to care, custody, and control of one’s
children. Although Washington and other states certainly have an
interest in regulating the practice of surrogacy for the purpose of
furthering the well-being of surrogates, intended parents, and the
children born of those relationships, the substantive gloss on the Due
Process Clause does not allow them to deny people the ability to
exercise these fundamental rights by means of prohibition, nor does it
allow states to discourage the practice by placing barriers in the way of
intended parents who seek to establish legal parentage of children born
via surrogacy.

412. See Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1983) (noting that heightened scrutiny applies to
illegitimacy classifications, reasoning that it is unjust to punish children for their parent’s conduct);
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982) (applying heightened scrutiny to laws that discriminate
against children of illegal aliens, employing the same logic).

